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The End of Shareholder Litigation? Allowing 
Shareholders to Customize Enforcement Through 
Arbitration Provisions in Charters and Bylaws 
* Paul Weitzel 
Shareholder litigation has been heavily criticized for its inability to com-
pensate harmed shareholders or deter managerial misconduct. While some have 
suggested abolishing shareholder litigation altogether, this Article takes a more 
moderate approach. I propose allowing shareholders to enforce charter and by-
law provisions that require arbitration of certain disputes. For example, an ac-
quisitive company may require arbitration of merger-related suits while allow-
ing non-merger suits to proceed in court. Likewise, a company in an industry 
known for volatile stock prices could require a price drop of three or four stand-
ard deviations before the suit could be brought in court, rather than arbitra-
tion. Because enforcement would be customized on a company-by-company ba-
sis, shareholders could set a better balance between costs and benefits than the 
ham-fisted, one-size-fits-all regime functioning today. This proposal requires no 
legislative action; it requires only that the SEC bring its statutory interpreta-
tion in line with current Supreme Court precedent. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Shareholder litigation is inefficient at compensating harmed 
shareholders and deterring managerial misconduct. It is also plagued 
by strike suits designed to force nuisance settlements. Several re-
forms have been offered, but these reforms are either rigid, which 
harms both meritless and meritorious suits alike, or flexible, which 
are often costly and subject to political pressures. Customized arbi-
tration provisions improve upon these reforms by allowing enforce-
ment to be tailored to each company's needs, granting some suits a 
quick death in arbitration and others the full protections of litiga-
tion. The concerns about arbitration arise from two misconceptions. 
First, shareholder litigation is not about management. Managers 
and directors may have their names on the complaint, but at the end 
of the day, the shareholders write the check, and the managers keep 
their yachts. Studies show that shareholder litigation has little effect 
on a manager or director's wallet or reputation. So when evaluating 
remedies, the balance is not between the needs of shareholders and 
management; it is about finding the right balance of benefits and 
costs to shareholders in a suit against themselves. 
Second, this is not about litigation. Nearly all shareholder suits 
settle. These suits are about settlement, not judgment. So when eval-
uating the benefits and drawbacks of reform proposals, such as arbi-
tration, we err by comparing them to litigation. With these percep-
tions corrected, most of the disadvantages of arbitration melt away. 
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I propose allowing shareholders to decide what level of protec-
tion shareholder litigation should provide. I propose doing this by 
allowing firms to include mandatory arbitration provisions in their 
charters or bylaws. This does not require a change in the law; instead 
it requires the SEC to reverse its position that arbitration violates 
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, bringing the commission 
back in line with current Supreme Court precedent. 
Under my proposal, some firms may choose to retain the current 
regime. Others might opt for binding arbitration of all claims. I sus-
pect most would explore a mix of arbitration and litigation, custom-
ized to their needs. For example, acquisitive firms may push claims 
regarding mergers into arbitration but allow more typical fraud 
claims to continue through the courts. This proposal adds flexibility, 
lowers the cost to taxpayers, and customizes solutions on a compa-
ny-by-company basis. To invoke Smith, Wright, and Hintze's semi-
nal theory, it leverages corporations as "laboratories of corporate 
governance." 1 
Further, because I do not propose imposing arbitration on any 
company, but instead allowing each company the freedom to adopt 
arbitration as it sees fit, it is not clear why we should care whether it 
offers benefits to the company. Because managers are rationally apa-
thetic to shareholder litigation, there is little reason to suspect they 
will spend political capital pushing through arbitration against the 
shareholders' will. And if it is the shareholders' will to limit their 
own remedy, why should the government stop them? 
Part II of this Article summarizes the current theory, criticisms, 
and proposed reforms of shareholder litigation. 
Part III sets out my proposal, which is to allow corporations to 
creatively structure arbitration agreements to balance the benefits 
and costs of enforcement. 
Part IV addresses likely responses. This Part will show why an 
arbitration provision would not violate securities laws, a claim the 
SEC is likely to make. It will also show that, while legislators will 
likely rail against arbitration, federal legislation is unlikely, and state 
legislation is likely preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act. The 
plaintiffs' bar will likely sue to stop enforcement, but state contract 
defenses to enforcement will likely fail. 
1. D. Gordon Smith, Matthew Wright & Marcus Kai Hintze, Private Ordering with Share-
holder Bylaws, 80 FORDHAM L REV. 125, 181 (2011). 
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II. THE THEORY, CRITICISMS, AND PROPOSED REFORMS OF 
SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 
A. Balancing Shareholder Costs 
The debate over shareholder litigation has often been framed as a 
struggle between shareholders and management. This makes sense. 
The separation of capital from management creates misaligned in-
centives that often cause management to cheat. To prevent these 
agency costs, shareholders incur monitoring and enforcement costs. 
Because all of these costs are focused on keeping management in 
line, a great deal of effort has gone into reaching the right balance 
between shareholder protection, managerial innovation, and freedom 
to operate. 
This balance misses the larger point. The costs of managerial 
misconduct are all borne by shareholders. They bear the cost of 
fraud, of monitoring, of enforcing, and of missed opportunities 
caused by overly restricting management. In addition, if the markets 
lose their reputation for trustworthiness, shareholders pay the risk 
premium associated with less trustworthy markets. 
Because the costs of misconduct and the costs to prevent mis-
conduct are all borne by shareholders, the goal should not be to bal-
ance management and shareholder interests but to balance share-
holders' overall costs. 
To discuss this balance, it is necessary to briefly consider the 
costs shareholders face, in particular the cost of managerial fraud. 
1. The direct costs of fraud 
Fraud has severe direct costs on shareholders. Although this is 
noncontroversial, a few notable examples highlight the point. 
When Enron, once the seventh largest corporation in America, 2 
revealed its accounting fraud, its investors lost around $11 billion. 3 
2. Fortune 500: 2001 Full List, CNN MONEY, http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/ 
fortune500_archive/full/2001 (last visited Oct. 28, 2012). 
3. George j. Benston, The Quality of Corporate Financial Statements and Their Auditors Before 
and After Enron, POLICY ANALYSIS, Nov. 6, 2003, at 12 available at http://www.cato.org/ 
pub _display.php?pub _id= 1356; see also David A. Westbrook, Corporation Law After Enron: The Pos-
sibility of a Capitalist Reimagination, 92 GEO. L.j. 61, 64 (2003). Others have estimated the losses at 
around $29 billion. See Jonathan H. Gabriel, Note, Misdirected? Potential Issues with Reliance on Inde-
pendent Directors for Prevention of Corporate Fraud, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 641, 642 (2005). 
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Less than a year later W orldcom revealed fraud that some estimate 
cost its investors over $175 billion.4 These frauds wiped out the re-
tirement investments of thousands of employees, who also found 
themselves out ofwork.5 
More recently, Bernie Madoff, former chairman of the NASDAQ 
and Wall Street legend, 6 pled guilty to bilking investors out of 
around $65 billion through a Ponzi scheme? In short, the direct 
costs of fraud are high. 
2. Collateral costs of fraud 
In addition to the direct costs, when fraud is revealed, share pric-
es typically drop further than the cost of the fraud per share. 8 This 
abnormal return may reflect damage to management's reputation, 
uncertainty about the actual effect of the loss, or an expectation of 
higher enforcement and monitoring costs to come. 
A more diffuse cost is the effect of fraud on the perception of the 
market as a whole. Trust in the market is a public good that can be-
come subject to the tragedy of the commons. That is, fraud is costly, 
so rational investors will require a higher premium to invest in mar-
kets that are perceived as more conducive to fraud. Businesses seek-
ing to raise capital at the lowest possible cost have an interest in rig-
orously excluding those who harm the perception of a fair market. 
Every fraud hurts everyone. 
4. Daniel Kadlec, WorldCon, TIME, july 8, 2002, at 28, available at http://www.time.com/ 
time/classroom/glenfall2002/pdfs/Business.pdf. 
5. See id.; see also Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2942 (20 10) (Sotomayor, L 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
6. Monica Gagnier, The Rise and Fall of Bernard L. Madoff BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Dec. 
12, 2008), http:/ /www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/blogs/recession _in_ america/ archives/ 
2008/12/the_rise _ and_fa.html. 
7. Madoff Gets 150 Years for Fraud, CBC NEWS Qun. 29, 2009), 
www.cbc.ca/news/business/ story/2009/06/29/madoff-ponzi-fraud-sentence564.html. This fig-
ure likely overstates investor losses because the nature of the Ponzi scheme required Mad off to 
pay some returns to investors. The net loss figure is estimated at around $18 billion. See The 
Madoff Scam: Meet the Liquidator, CBS NEWS Qun. 20, 2010), 
http:/ /www.cbsnews.com/stories/20 1 0/06/19/60minutes/main 6598786.shtml. 
8. See]. DAVID CUMMINS, CHRISTOPHER M. LEWIS & RAN WEI, THE MARKET VALUE IMPACT 
OF OPERATIONAL RISK EVENTS FOR U.S. BANKS AND INSURERS 34-35 (Dec. 23, 2004). available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=640061; jASON PERRY & PATRICK DE FONTNOUVELLE, MEASURING 
REPUTATIONAL RISK: THE MARKET REACTION TO OPERATIONAL Loss ANNOUNCEMENTS 1-3 (Oct. 
30, 2005), available at http:/ /ssrn.com/abstract=861364; 
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3. Costs of preventing fraud 
Investors also face the costs of preventing fraud, which include 
monitoring and enforcement costs. These costs usually increase in re-
sponse to increased direct costs as litigation creates new enforcement 
costs and political pressure creates new monitoring requirements. 
For example, after the accounting scandals that rocked Enron 
and WorldCom, and to a lesser extent Halliburton, Qwest, Tyco, 
AIG, and Parmalat,9 Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002, which requires new internal control procedures designed to 
expose and prevent fraud. 10 The compliance cost of these new pro-
cedures in 2007 was around $1.7 million per company, 11 more than 
eighteen times the SEC's original cost estimate. 12 
Likewise, enforcement costs can quickly get out of hand. Clean-
ing up the Madoff fraud, which had a net cost to direct investors of 
about $18 billion, 13 will likely cost more than $1.1 billion for attor-
neys, accountants, and consultants. 14 
This paper focuses on enforcement costs, specifically shareholder 
litigation. Enforcement serves as a deterrent to prevent fraud, but 
over-enforcement or inefficient enforcement can create more costs 
than benefits. Shareholders may find that arbitration reduces their 
enforcement costs more than it increases agency and monitoring 
9. Mark Klock, Improving the Culture of Ethical Behavior in the Financial Sector: Time to Express-
ly Provide for Private Enforcement Against Aiders and Abettors of Securities Fraud, Il6 PENN. ST. L. REV. 
437, 457 (20Il). 
10. See I5 U.S.C. § 7262 (20I2). 
II. FE! Survey: Average 2007 SOX Compliance Cost $1.7 Million, FINANCIAL EXECUTIVES 
INTERNATIONAL (Apr. 30, 2008), http://fei.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=43&item=204. This is 
down from $2.92 million in 2006. See SEC Moves to Reduce Sarbanes-Oxley Costs, N.Y. TIMES (May 
23, 2007), http:/ /www.nytimes.com/2007 /05/23/business/worldbusiness/23iht-regs.4.5843 7 
OO.html. 
I2. See Joseph A. Grundfest & Steven E. Bochner, Fixing 404, 105 MICH. L. REV. I643, 
1645-46 (2007) (noting also that first-year implementation costs were eighty times greater than 
the SEC had estimated for companies with market capitalizations over $700 million). 
13. See The MadoffScam: Meet The Liquidator, supra note 7. 
14. David S. Hilzenrath, After Madoff Fees for Lawyers, Others Untangling Mess Expected to Top 
$1 Billion, WASH. PosT (Mar. 31, 20ll), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/ 
inspector-general-finds-sec-practices-might-compromise-fraud-probes/2011/03/31/ 
AFYKgVAC_story.html?hpid=z3; see also Linda Sandler, Lehman, Madoff Lawyer Fees May Deplete 
Investor Fund, SEC's Watchdog Says, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 31, 20ll), 
http:/ /www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-31/high-lehman-madoff-lawyer-fees-may-deplete-
si pc-sec-watchdog-report -says. html. 
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costs, in which case it would be a net gain for shareholders. I begin 
with a more detailed review of shareholder litigation. 
B. Shareholder Litigation Theory 
This section discusses the sources, purposes, problems, and pro-
posed reforms of shareholder litigation. 
1. Sources of shareholder litigation 
There are three major sources of shareholder litigation. The most 
criticized is derivative litigation, which allows a shareholder to sue 
on behalf of the company. These suits are usually brought against 
the officers and directors of a corporation for breach of a fiduciary 
duty. 15 
A second common source of shareholder litigation is shareholder 
securities fraud class action suits. Professors Baker and Griffith 
found that ninety-three percent of securities class actions brought in 
2005 alleged fraud, specifically violations of Rule 1 Ob-5 under the 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act"). 16 Rule 
lOb-S of the Exchange Act prohibits fraud and misstatements in the 
sale of a security. 17 These claims are brought directly under the fed-
eral securities laws and are removable to federal court. 18 
A third common type of shareholder litigation is class actions 
challenging director action in an acquisition. Thompson and Thomas 
15. Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder Litigation: Ac-
quisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133, 135-36 (2004). 
16. Tom Baker & Sean]. Griffith, Predicting Corporate Governance Risk: Evidence from the Di-
rectors' & Officers' Liability Insurance Market, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 487, 498 (2007). 
17. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012). The statute states the following: 
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It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any na-
tional securities exchange, 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances 
under which they were made, not misleading, or 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would op-
erate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of 
any security. 
18. 15 u.s.c. § 77p (2012). 
65 The End of Shareholder Litigation? 
found that this type of litigation makes up around eighty percent of all 
breach of fiduciary duty claims in the Delaware Court of Chancery. 19 
2. Purpose and problems of shareholder litigation 
Shareholder litigation is meant to allow shareholders to check 
the agency cost of managers and directors. In that sense shareholder 
litigation is designed to be compensatory-it puts cash back into the 
pockets of wronged shareholders-and a deterrent-it punishes 
managers for their bad acts, which incentivizes them to behave well. 
a. Compensation theory, pocket-shifting, and well-diversified investors. 
The compensation justification is widely rejected by scholars.20 
Because settlements to shareholders are paid from the company's 
treasury, which already belongs to the shareholders, the payments 
are mere pocket-shifting.21 This means shareholder settlements are 
little more than a court-enforced dividend with heavy transaction 
costs.22 Even settlements paid by insurers or consultants are paid by 
the shareholders through higher fees. 23 Put simply, shareholders 
cannot come out ahead by suing themselves. 
Diversification creates a more subtle problem. The bad acts that 
form the basis of these suits create winners and losers among share-
holders. For example, those who hold shares when a manager tells a 
pleasant lie benefit from the lie. Those who hold shares when the lie 
19. Thompson & Thomas, supra note IS, at 137. 
20. See, e.g .. John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence 
and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1545-47 (2006); janet Cooper Alexander, Re-
thinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 STAN. L. Rt:v. 1487, l503 (1996); Frank H. Easter-
brook & Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 52 U. CHI. L. Rr.v. 611, 641-42 
(1985); Donald C. Langcvoort, Capping Damages for Open-Market Securities Fraud, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 
639, 648-50 (1996). 
21. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 20, at 1503; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 20, at 
641-42 (pointing out that a diversified investor is as likely to bencl!t from fraud as to be harmed 
by it, so payments from current to past shareholders are inefficient in the face of monitoring and 
enforcement costs). 
22. See, e.g., Coffee, Jr., supra note 20, at 1545-47. 
23. Suits against consultants are uncommon. In 2011, auditors were named in only 3% of 
securities class actions, and underwriters were named in only 10%. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, 
SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS: 2011 YEAR IN REVIEW 27 (2012), available at 
http:/ /bit.ly/UlLmml; see also Langevoort, supra note 20, at 648-50 (arguing persuasively that 
securities litigation settlements are funded in three ways: (I) from the company, (2) from an 
insurer, or (3) from a service provider, such as an accounting firm). Transfers from the company 
are "pocket-shifting," and transfers from insurers or service providers are reflected in higher 
premiums and fees. Id. 
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is revealed are harmed by the lie. For shareholders that buy and hold 
the company's shares through both of these events, the direct bene-
fits and costs of the lie balance each other out. But while the fraud is 
ongoing, active shareholders may sell (thereby benefiting) or buy 
(thereby being harmed). A well-diversified investor is as likely to 
benefit from the fraud as to be harmed by it, so, in the end, well-
diversified investors net to zero. So well-diversified investors, ex 
ante, should show as little concern to the direct costs of the fraud as 
to the direct benefits because they are equally likely to face either.24 
Of course, opportunism will spur concern when applied to a specific 
situation. But shareholder litigation doesn't cure these harms; it 
merely complicates the accounting by repaying shareholders harmed 
by the fraud with money taken from current shareholders, who may 
not have benefited from the fraud. In the end, the current sharehold-
ers must repay not only the benefits taken by those who sold earlier 
but also the litigation costs associated with making those payments. 
Because shareholders are paying their own recoveries, and be-
cause well-diversified investors net to zero, compensating sharehold-
ers cannot justify shareholder litigation. 
Professor Daniel Morrissey argues that this reasoning applies on-
ly to well-diversified investors, so a simple shareholder with an un-
varied portfolio may still benefit from shareholder litigation.25 This 
assumes simple shareholders trade as actively as more sophisticated 
investors. Shareholder settlements are paid only to those that bought 
or sold during the period tainted by fraud. 26 If simple investors are 
more likely to adopt a buy-and-hold strategy,27 they are less likely to 
be part of any settlements, so there will be no litigation gains to off-
set litigation losses. Shareholder litigation is likely more costly to 
simple investors with unvaried portfolios, not less. 
24. By no means do I mean to discount the indirect costs of fraud discussed elsewhere in 
this Part, but indirect costs do not justify shareholder litigation under the compensation theory. 
25. Daniel]. Morrissey, Shareholder Litigation After the Meltdown, 114 W.VA. L. REV. 531, 
556 (2012). 
26. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248-49 (1988). 
27. Professor Zhang finds that about 78% of trading volume is conducted by high-
frequency traders, which make up 1·-2% of all trading firms. X. FRANK ZHANG, HIGH-FREQUENCY 
TRADING, STOCK VOLATILITY, AND PRICE DISCOVERY 16 (2010), available at http://ssrn.com/ ab-
stract= 1691679. This suggests it is unlikely that simple investors make up much of the remain-
ing volume. 
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b. Deterrence. Shareholder litigation's second justification is 
deterrence. The deterrence theory says that managers will be less 
likely to misbehave if they will be punished for it. In effect, 
shareholder litigation supplements pre-fraud monitoring. The theory 
fails because shareholder litigation rarely punishes managers. 
Ninety-six percent of shareholder securities class actions settle 
within common insurance limits, leaving insurers to fully fund the 
settlement. 28 Even when insurers do not cover the entire settlement, 
individual defendants rarely make up the difference with personal 
funds. 29 
An argument could be made that shareholder litigation has repu-
tational costs, but this is unlikely because litigation is ubiquitous. 
Over a five-year period, the average public company has a ten per-
cent chance of facing a class action securities suit.30 Transaction-
oriented firms face even worse odds. Approximately ninety-four per-
cent of mergers now lead to shareholder suits.31 If everyone is being 
sued, being sued no longer signals incompetence. 
Professor Eric Helland's always insightful work bears this out.32 
His review of director elections after a shareholder class action found 
that directors suffered a loss of reputation only in shareholder suits 
that resulted in settlement values in the top quartile or where the 
SEC was involved. 33 SEC involvement signals possible criminal activ-
ity, and high settlement values may signal incompetent negotiating. 
Because there is no out-of-pocket cost or reputational cost to 
most shareholder suits, they are an ineffective deterrent. 
c. Other justifications: corporate governance and informed trading. 
Professor Lawrence E. Mitchell offers a clever, alternative 
28. See james D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 497, 
512 (1997); see also janet Cooper Alexander, The Lawsuit Avoidance Theory of Why Initial Public Offer-
ings Are Underpriced, 41 UCLA L. REV. 17, 46-47 (1993). 
29. See Alexander, supra note 20, at 1498-99. 
30. See Coffee, Jr., supra note 20, at 1547-48. 
31. MATTHEW D. CAIN & STEVEN M. DAVIDOFF, TAKEOVER LITIGATION IN 2011, at 2 (2012), 
available at http:! /ssrn.com/abstract= 1998482. 
32. Eric Helland, Reputational Penalties and the Merits of Class-Action Securities Litigation, 49 
J.L. & EcoN. 365, 366 (2006). 
33. ld.; see also Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 j.L. 
ECON. & ORe .. 55,84 (1991) (finding slight increase in turnover ofCEOs at firms subject to suit, 
but overall finding "little evidence of specific deterrence" for management). 
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justification for securities litigation: punishing shareholders.34 
Mitchell argues that shareholders have a "responsibility to protect 
the integrity of our financial markets through their voting and 
trading."35 Failing in this duty leads to fraud, which leads to the 
pains of shareholder litigation, which may prod otherwise free-riding 
shareholders to monitor management more closely. In effect, he fixes 
the deterrence problem not by changing who is punished but by 
redefining who deserves punishment. 
This argument has a few weaknesses. First, state law places 
sharp limits on shareholders' ability to control management. 36 In-
creasing the incentive to act cannot overcome the inability to act. 
Second, it is unclear what the punishment should urge the share-
holders to do. Collective action necessary to modify controls on 
management can be extremely costly, often involving a proxy con-
test.37 In contrast, the cost of shareholder litigation, on a per share 
basis, is still just a gadfly. The costs of shareholder litigation will 
rarely be sufficient to incentivize a rational investor to run a proxy 
contest rather than sell his shares. Finally, shareholder litigation no 
longer signals that management has misbehaved. As discussed 
above, shareholder litigation has become so ubiquitous that even a 
shareholder that is willing to act would not see the shareholder suit 
as a signal that action is needed. 
Empirical evidence also challenges this theory. Professor Talley 
found that very few corporate governance practices were statistically 
significant in predicting the targets of shareholder litigation.38 Share 
price, volatility, and volume were far better predictors.39 If corporate 
governance is not a good predictor of litigation, then a properly mo-
34. Lawrence E. Mitchell, The "Innocent Shareholder": An Essay on Compensation and Deterrence 
in Securities Class-Action Lawsuits, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 243, 291-92 (2009). 
35. Id. at 292. 
36. See ]ill E. Fisch, Confronting the Circularity Problem in Private Securities Litigation, 2009 
WIS. L. REV. 333, 340-41 (2009) (discussing legal limitations on shareholders' ability to prevent 
management from acting badly). 
37. See Shareholder Choice Regarding Proxy Materials, 72 Fed. Reg. 42222-01, 42230-31, 
42231 n.l14 (Aug. 1, 2007) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) (providing data from a proxy 
service that estimated the average cost of a paper proxy at $5.64 per shareholder and notice of an 
internet proxy at $2.36 per shareholder, assuming 19% still request paper copies). 
38. Eric L. Talley, Public Ownership, Firm Governance, and Litigation Risk, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 
335,350-52,363-66 (2009). 
39. Id. at 349-50. 
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tivated shareholder would not attempt to reduce shareholder litiga-
tion by focusing on corporate governance. 
Professor Jill Fisch offers an alternative justification, arguing that 
securities litigation promotes informed trading. She argues that se-
curities fraud disproportionately harms informed investors, who ac-
tively trade on information, including false information.40 Research 
done by these investors becomes incorporated into share prices, and 
accurate share prices are a public good. In this sense, informed trad-
ing creates an externality. However, informed traders are less likely 
to be diversified, she argues, because of the high research costs asso-
ciated with investing in an additional company.41 Because they are 
less diversified, and because they actively trade on information, they 
are more likely to be net losers from fraud. On the other hand, be-
cause they trade more frequently than buy-and-hold investors, and 
trade based on new information, they are more likely to be part of 
the class in securities litigation, making them net winners in litiga-
tion. She argues that securities litigation compensates informed 
traders for the externalities they provide by offsetting their greater-
than-average losses from fraud. 42 
One problem with this argument is that a trade requires activity 
from two parties: a buyer and a seller. So if a trade occurs during 
the period affected by fraud, the fraud creates one winner and one 
loser. If the buyer and seller are both informed traders, then in-
formed traders as a whole have not been made worse off. If both 
are uninformed traders, then there is no net effect on informed 
traders. So the theory works only when a trade occurs between an 
informed trader and an uninformed trader, and then only if they are 
on the right side. Though certainly possible, it seems unlikely that 
these trades could make up enough volume for this theory to find 
support.43 
40. Fisch, supra note 36, at 346-48. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. 
43. Professor Zhang has found that about seventy-eight percent of trading volume is by 
high-frequency traders and that these trades hinder price discovery rather than improve it. X. 
FRANK ZHANG, supra note 27, at 13-16, 26. This raises questions of how often uninformed trad-
ers trade with informed traders and the value added by these traders. Without more clearly de-
fined terms, it is difficult to say whether these high-frequency traders are informed or not. 
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d. Costs. In addition to offering very little bang, shareholder 
litigation costs a lot of buck. These suits are expensive, so as a 
compensatory device, they are grossly inefficient. A survey of 
settlements from 2002 found that the avera~e securities class action 
settled for 2.9% of its estimated damages. 4 From these recoveries, 
plaintiffs' attorneys take 25-35%.45 The payout to small investors 
after these fees is often so low that they do not even bother to collect 
it.46 
A full accounting of costs must also include defense costs, which 
the shareholders must pay, and which likely match the plaintiff-side 
costs,47 and the costs of distracting managers from their duties. As 
CEO salaries rise, so does the cost of wasting their time. 
These suits create public costs as well. On an unconsolidated ba-
sis, securities class actions made up 48% of all class actions that 
were pending in federal court between 2004 and 2005.48 
Finally, these suits cost the U.S. markets their competitive-
ness. The Committee on Capital Markets Regulation found that 
foreign issuers commonly cite the enforcement system as the 
most important reason for not listing in U.S. markets.49 The in-
creased cost of the U.S. enforcement system is reflected in insur-
ance rates. Fortune 500 companies listed in the U.S. typically car-
ry twice as much D&O insurance as those listed in Europe and 
pay triple the rate per dollar of coverage. 50 These increased costs 
harm the competitiveness of the U.S. capital markets, which has 
declined in nearly every measure over the last few years. 51 
44. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS, 2002: A YEAR IN 
REVIEW 5 (2003), available at http:/ /securiries.stanford.edu/clearinghouse _research/2002 _ YIR/ 
2002 _yir _settlements. pdf. 
45. COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT Of' THE COMMITTEE ON 
CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION 79 (2006). 
46. Miles Weiss, Carlyle Curbing Shareholder Rights Irritates Lawmakers Who See Precedent, 
BLOOMBERG Oan. 25, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-26/cariyle-lawsuit-ban-
deplored-by-lawmakers-may-entice-followers.html (paraphrasing Professor Hal Scott). 
47. COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, supra note 45. 
48. ld. at 74. This figure likely overstates the total burden because discovery is often con-
solidated, and only 8% of these cases proceed to a ruling on summary judgment. See 
CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 23, at 18. 
49. COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, supra note 45, at 71. 
50. Id. at 78. 
51. COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, THE COMPETITIVE POSITION Or- THE U.S. PUBLIC 
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e. Unintended consequences. Shareholder litigation also creates other 
unfortunate consequences. Ironically, shareholder litigation can 
actually make it more difficult to detect and punish managerial 
fraud. The typical shareholder suit runs something like this. After 
the announcement of a merger or a major decline in the stock price, 
entrepreneurial plaintiffs' attorneys file suit and attempt to force a 
quick settlement. Their ability to quickly stake a claim and then 
settle has led many in the industry to label them "pilgrims."52 
The problem is that managers have learned to play along. They 
realize that large transactions will inevitably lead to shareholder 
suits53 and that settling with pilgrims can create a bar against later, 
possibly meritorious, suits.54 By settling quickly with the pilgrims, 
management avoids the costs of discovery, substantive negotiation, 
and the risks of actual litigation. 55 This wide release from future 
claims eliminates the primary goals of shareholder suits: to detect, 
deter, and punish managerial misconduct. 
A second unintended consequence flows from these settlements. 
In 2005, shareholders sued in 38.7% of large acquisitions. 56 By 2011 
that number had climbed to 94.2%.57 Because litigation is expected, 
a rational dealmaker will account for it as a transaction cost during 
negotiations. 58 This operates as a tax on every transaction, which, 
like most taxes, creates a deadweight loss. Because rational dealmak-
ers expect this cost, there are mutually beneficial deals on the mar-
gin that are never done, creating efficiency losses to no one's gain. 
EQUITY MARKET 5 (2007) (showing a decline in U.S. competitiveness across a number of 
measures, including number of U.S. initial public offerings listed only abroad and foreign delist-
ing on the New York Stock Exchange). 
52. See In re Revlon, Inc. S'holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 945 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
53. Cain and Davidoff found that 94.2% of mergers resulted in shareholder litigation in 
20ll~up from 38.7% in 2005. CAIN & DAVIDOFF, supra note 31. 
54. See Rev/on, 990 A.2d at 952, 956, 59-60. 
55. See id. (noting that the plaintiffs' counsel never even bothered to put on a facade of 
discovery). 
56. CAIN & DAVIDOFF, supra note 31. 
57. ld. 
58. See Romano, supra note 33, at 62-63. 
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3. Past proposals for reform 
For years, shareholders, legislators, and academics have pro-
posed reforms. Reform proposals come in two types: rigid reforms 
that affect all suits and flexible reforms that rely on gatekeeper dis-
cretion. 
Among the rigid reforms are those that heighten pleading re-
quirements,59 expand safe harbors, 60 limit who can sue, 61 cap dam-
age amounts,62 or delay discovery.63 These reforms have the ad-
vantage of being easy to administer and remaining uninfluenced by 
discretionary politics or prejudice. They tend to keep the playing 
field level while moving back the goal posts. 
The downside is that they are blunt instruments which cannot 
actively balance over-enforcement with under-enforcement. The fil-
ters restrict the meritorious and frivolous alike. 
This has led some scholars to call for a regulatory gatekeeper, 
which would prescreen suits to determine whether to allow them to 
proceed. Professor Amanda Rose argues that the SEC could fulfill 
this role.64 Professor A.C. Pritchard goes a step further, arguing for 
the elimination of private enforcement of some types of shareholder 
suits and instead authorizing the securities exchanges to be the sole 
enforcers. 65 
The gatekeeper approach has many advantages. It preserves the 
benefits of discretionary non-enforcement, limits over-enforcement, 
and avoids the under-enforcement caused by more rigid reforms. 
However, it has two large drawbacks. First, the gatekeeper's in-
centives may not align with the shareholders'. Gatekeepers are sub-
ject to regulatory capture and political pressure, which could cause 
under-enforcement in industries that capture the gatekeeper and 
over-enforcement in industries that are politically unpopular. 
59. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 
737, 747(2) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77-78 (2000)). 
60. Id. at 749-51. 
61. Id. at 740 (preventing a person from being a lead plaintiff more than five times in 
three years). 
62. Langevoort, supra note 20, at 648-50. 
63. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of1995, 109 Stat. at 737. 
64. Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring the Relationship Be-
tween Public and Private Enforcement of Rule JOb-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301, 1305 (2008). 
65. A.C. Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class Actions with Exchanges as 
Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925, 983 (1999). 
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Second, gatekeepers are expensive. Prescreening every suit 
would entail huge costs that would require increased taxes or fees. 66 
If the regulator were the sole enforcer, these costs would be even 
higher. 
III. THE REMEDY: FREEDOM TO ARBITRATE 
I propose allowing shareholders and management to set the bal-
ance between over- and under-enforcement by adopting arbitration 
provisions in their bylaws or charter. 
A. Allowing Arbitration 
What follows is the affirmative argument explaining how these 
provisions might work and some examples of the many variations 
creative shareholders might develop to suit their needs. I address the 
legal arguments against enforcement in Part IV below. 
1. Why an arbitration provision will likely be enforceable 
An arbitration provision is enforceable whether analyzed under 
the Federal Arbitration Act or Delaware law. 
The Federal Arbitration Act requires enforcement of all agree-
ments to arbitrate. 67 A corporation's bylaws and charter form a 
binding agreement between the corporation and its shareholders and 
directors.68 So if either the bylaws or charter require arbitration of 
shareholder disputes, it is an agreement to arbitrate that must be en-
forced under the Federal Arbitration Act. 
Looking at it another way, the Delaware Court of Chancery re-
cently suggested that corporations may include forum selection 
clauses in their charter to avoid litigating shareholder disputes in fo-
rums other than the Court of Chancery. 69 An arbitration clause is 
nothing more than a "specialized kind of forum-selection 
clause."70 So if a corporation can amend its charter to select the 
66. It may be possible to bill the plaintiffs for this screening under the assumption that if 
the claim is not worth the screening fee, it should not be brought. 
67. 9 u.s.c. § 2 (2012). 
68. See Kidsco, Inc. v. Dinsmore, 674 A.2d 483, 492 (Del. Ch. 1995). 
69. See ln re Revlon, Inc. S'holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
70. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 482-83 (1989) 
(quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506,519 (1974)). 
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Court of Chancery as the forum, it can likewise select arbitration as 
the forum. 
2. Setting loose the "laboratories of corporate governance" 71 
The exact language of the provision could be as unique as the 
company chooses. It might apply arbitration to all claims or only to 
certain categories of claims, such as those involving mergers or those 
valued above a certain amount. Arbitration could be the initial fo-
rum, or apply only when a party requests arbitration or after the 
complaint survives a motion to dismiss. 72 
One variation that might create a good balance would be to begin 
the case in arbitration but allow shareholders to remove the case to 
federal court with the written consent of some percentage of the 
outstanding shares. This would ensure a low-cost death for frivolous 
claims but allow the full protections of federal court when share-
holders agree the suit is worthwhile. 
A variation on that alternative would be to expand or contract 
the scope of judicial review of the arbitral award. 73 The provision 
could provide for complete de novo review by the courts or de novo 
review of law, with limited review of facts. 
Firms with complex arbitration provisions may allow an arbitra-
tor to determine if a dispute is subject to arbitration-a practice ap-
proved by the Supreme Court. 74 
These are just a few examples of what corporations may discover. 
Allowing the freedom to adopt a provision that is right for them lev-
erages the full creativity of these "laboratories of corporate govern-
ance."75 
71. Smith, Wright & Hintze, supra note 1, at 181. 
72. See Bradley j. Bondi, Facilitating Economic Recovery and Sustainable Growth Through Reform 
of the Securities Class-Action System: Exploring Arbitration as an Alternative to I.itigation, 33 HARV. ].L. & 
PUB. POL'Y 607, 635 (2010). 
73. See jENNIFER j. jOHNSON & EDWARD BRUNET, ARBITRATION OF SHAREHOLDER CLAIMS: 
WHY CHANGE IS NOT ALWAYS A MEASURE OF PROGRESS 28, available at 
http:/ /SSRN.com/abstract= 1112826. 
74. See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944-45 (implying that in 
some circumstances the parties likely considered the scope of arbitration when drafting the con-
traer). 
75. Smith, Wright & Hintze, supra note 1, at 181. 
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B. Pros and Cons of Arbitration 
There are many benefits to arbitration. 
[I]t is usually cheaper and faster than litigation; it can have simpler 
procedural and evidentiary rules; it normally minimizes hostility 
and is less disruptive of ongoing and future business dealings 
among the parties; it is often more flexible in regard to scheduling 
of times and places of hearings and discovery devices. 76 
At the outset, it is worth noting that my proposal is not that eve-
ry corporation should adopt an arbitration provision or that one arbi-
tration provision would work best for all corporations. Because I 
propose allowing each corporation to choose for itself the extent that 
it uses arbitration, if at all, the counterarguments carry the day only 
by showing (1) that arbitration is always worse for every corporation 
in every form or (2) that corporations will systematically adopt arbi-
tration provisions that are worse than the current enforcement re-
gime. This is a high bar, which I do not see met. 
1. Costs 
The most cited benefit of arbitration is the cost savings. I break 
down this analysis by considering procedural costs, liability costs, 
and spillover costs?7 It is worth mentioning that even if the average 
firm would pay more under arbitration, this is no reason to prohibit 
it. Not every firm is the average firm, so some may find it cost-
effective. And if the firm chooses to take upon itself higher costs, it's 
not clear why the government should prohibit if from doing so. 
a. Procedural costs. Procedural costs are the costs of reaching a 
disposition. Scholars generally agree that arbitration is less 
expensive than litigation because, as Professor David Schwartz 
explains, arbitration "offers less room for complexity."78 
76. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 280 (1995) (quoting H.R. Rep. 
No. 97-542, at 13 (1982) ). But see Henry S. Noyes, If You (Re)Build It, They Will Come: Contracts to 
Remake the Rules of Litigation in Arbitration's Image, 30 HARV. j.L. & PUB. POL'Y 579, 585-94 (2007) 
(arguing that arbitration has none of these advantages). 
77. See David S. Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1247, 1266 67 (2009) (dividing up arbitration costs by liability and procedural costs). 
78. Td. at 1268. 
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Arbitration cuts costs by cutting options. It offers limited discov-
ery and motions practice. Discovery costs alone typically average 
about 50% of total litigation costs. 79 
It is not clear how much of these cost savings will apply in 
shareholder disputes. Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act (PSLRA), discovery does not begin until after the court rules on 
any motion to dismiss.80 About 16% of cases settle before this, and 
another 9% are voluntarily dismissed, meaning 25% never reach dis-
covery anyway. 81 Nearly 90% of the remaining cases are either dis-
missed or settled after surviving a motion to dismiss, with only 8% 
of all filings reaching a ruling on summary judgment. 82 While it is 
unclear how much discovery occurs between a rejected motion to 
dismiss and an eventual settlement, 83 discovery seems to be the ex-
ception, rather than the rule. 
Discovery in significant securities class actions is typically con-
ducted through an e-discovery database, which costs one to three 
million dollars to set up. 84 Defendants obviously want to settle 
quickly and avoid these costs, but because the costs will be covered 
by insurance, which also pays for the plaintiffs' recovery, the plain-
tiffs also have an incentive to reduce costs. 85 With these aligned in-
centives, one would expect that few litigants would commence such 
costly discovery, but an illuminating survey by Professors Baker and 
Griffith found that the parties "emphasized" that they must "prepare 
for trial, if only to have a credible threat."86 
Because discovery costs can be astronomical and because the par-
ties insist on incurring them, it seems that any cost benefit gained 
from early dismissals is overwhelmed by enormous discovery costs. 
79. Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure Practice Under the 
1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525, 547-48 (1998). 
80. IS U.S.C. § 77z-l (b) (I) (2012) (applying discovery stay to litigation under the Securi-
ties Act of 1933); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (3) (B) (2012) (applying discovery stay to litigation under 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). 
81. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 23, at 18. 
82. Id. 
83. See, e.g., In re Revlon, Inc. S'holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 945 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
84. Tom Baker & Sean]. Griffith, How the Merits Matter: Directors' and Officers' Insurance and 
Securities Settlements, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 777 n.93 (2009). 
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
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This suggests that arbitration likely offers substantial net savings in 
procedural costs. 
Going further, firms may decide to leverage the benefits of both 
systems, adopting an arbitration provision that kicks in only if the 
case survives a motion to dismiss. 87 This avoids the high cost of dis-
covery without giving up the benefits of quick dismissals. 88 
b. Liability costs. Arbitration likely reduces liability costs as well. 
Jury verdicts in shareholder litigation suits are exceptionally rare. 89 
One commentator has noted that since the PSLRA was passed in 
1995, only seven securities class actions have reached a jury 
verdict.90 Because settlement is the near-certain outcome, liability 
costs are best calculated as settlement costs. 
Arbitration would likely reduce settlement costs significantly. By 
reducing the procedural costs of discovery, the alternative to settle-
ment is not as ruinous, which reduces the plaintiffs' power to extort 
large settlement values. 
Arbitration will also encourage early settlement because con-
sistent outcomes are easier to predict; predictable outcomes mean 
the parties will have settlement valuations of the case, which in-
creases the chance of an early settlement. 
There are a few reasons to think that arbitration would not reduce 
settlement values. First, the largest cost of shareholder litigation is of-
ten the decline in share price.91 For external shocks, share prices drop 
on a one-to-one ratio with the announced loss, but for announcements 
of internal fraud, the ratio is much higher.92 Even without the pressure 
of high procedural and liability costs, a corporation may settle high to 
87. See Bondi, supra note 72, at 635. 
88. See id. 
89. See id. at 633 ("[L]ess than two percent of civil claims filed in court are decided by a 
judge or jury."). 
90. Adam Savett, Only 7th Post-PSLRA jury Verdict Is In, ISS GOvERNANCE (May 7, 2009, 
6:04 PM), http:/ /blog.issgovernance.com/slw/2009/05/only-7th-post-pslra-jury-verdict -is-
in.html; See also Peter Lattman, A Rare Species: The Securities-Fraud Class-Action Trial, WALL ST. ].L. 
BLOG (Oct. 24, 2007, 3:07 PM), http:/ /blogs.wsj.com/law/2007 /10/24/a-rare-species-the-
securities-fraud-class-action-trial. 
91. See CUMMINS, LEWIS & WEI, supra note 8, at 34--35. 
92. PERRY & DE FONTNOUVELLE, supra note 8, at 2-3. 
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quickly regain its losses in share price. This is unlikely. Empirically, alt-
hough stocks decline with the announcement of a suit, there is no sta-
tistically significant bounce back when the suit is terminated. 93 
Second, corporations may not push for lower settlement values 
because they have no skin in the game. Because D&O insurance typ-
ically covers the entire settlement, corporations may face little incen-
tive to reduce the total settlement amount. This is unlikely because 
D&O insurers may raise premiums in response to high settle-
ments.94 
Third, because arbitration settlements are more likely to be con-
fidential, 95 a corporation may settle higher because there is less 
precedential value in a high settlement. However, this is unlikely be-
cause if the settlement value is material it would likely need to be 
reported on Form 8-K or the company's annual report. 96 
Fourth, some commentators believe that arbitrators are more 
likely to adopt a split-the-baby approach to awards, giving more 
money to plaintiffs' counsel than the suit is otherwise worth. How-
ever, the current regime is one of settlement, not judgment. Settle-
ment is a split-the-baby approach because plaintiffs' counsel has no 
incentive to settle without some payment. 
c. Feedback between liability costs and procedural costs. One might 
argue that because liability costs concern only the amount of money 
transferred from one pocket to the other, we should not care 
whether they are high or low but should focus on efficiency and 
procedural costs. This argument has some merit, but attorney fees 
are often calculated as a percentage of the settlement value, 97 so 
higher settlements lead to higher attorney fees. 
93. Daniel R. Fischel & Michael Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in 
Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 261, 282-83 (1985-1986). 
94. Romano, supra note 33, at 57. 
95. See, e.g., The Carlyle Grp. L.P., Registration Statement Under the Securities Act of 
1933 (Form S-1), at 288 Qan. 10, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/ 
1527166/000095012312000638/w83442a2sv1za.htm (proposing an arbitration provision with a 
confidentiality clause). 
96. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, CURRENT REPORT: PURSUANT TO SECTION l3 OR 15(D) OF 
THESECURITIESEXCHANGEACTOF 1934 (Form 8-K) Item 1.01. 
97. These fees typically run 25-35% of the total recovery. COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. 
REGULATION, supra note 45. 
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In addition, high recoveries encourage more strike suits. If arbi-
tration reduces recoveries, bounty-hunting plaintiff attorneys would 
have less incentive to file strike suits. If defendants do not face the 
risk of mega-awards or the high procedural costs of litigation, there 
is less incentive to settle high on a bogus claim. The plaintiffs' bar 
will realize the reduced value of strike suits and will be less likely to 
file them. 
d. Spillover costs. Arbitration would also reduce spillover costs to 
society and firms that are not being sued. With lower procedural and 
liability costs, D&O insurance rates will likely decline for all firms. 98 
And the public will benefit from moving the cases out of congested, 
publicly funded courts into privately funded arbitration. 
2. Speed 
A second advantage of arbitration is that it would likely be faster 
than the current regime. Currently, the average federal securities 
class action takes over four years to settle. 99 
Studies of bilateral arbitration have found it is two to three times 
faster than similar litigation. 10° Class actions are more complex, but 
studies still show that they "take considerably less time than in-
court proceedings in which class certification is sought." 101 If the 
advantages of bilateral arbitration applied at the same ratio, it could 
shave an average of thirty-one months off the time it takes to settle a 
98. 0&0 insurance rates in the U.S. are currently about six times higher than in Europe 
per dollar of coverage, which experts attribute to higher enforcement costs in the U.S. Td. at 71. 
99. ELLEN M. RYAN & LAURA E. SIMMONS, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS 
ACTION SETTLEMENTS, 2010 REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 3 (2011), available at http://securities. stan-
ford.edu/Settlements/REVIEW _199 5-201 0/Settlements _ Through_l2 _ 201 O.pdf. The average 
case in federal court takes 11.7 months from filing to a final disposition. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE 
U.S. COURTS, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES 
COURTS 15-16 (20 11), available at http://www. uscourts.gov /uscourts/Statistics 
/JudicialBusiness/20 1 0/J udicialBusiness20 1 0. pdf. 
100. Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Arbitration and Litigation of Employment Claims: An 
Empirical Comparison, 58 DISP. RESOL.]. 44, 51 (2003-2004) (finding that arbitration reaches a 
disposition 3.02 times faster than state litigation and 2.78 times faster than federal litigation in 
employment disputes). 
101. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1759 (2011) (Breyer,]., dissent-
ing). But see id. at 1751 (majority opinion) (criticizing the slow speed of class action arbitration 
compared to bilateral arbitration). 
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shareholder suit. 102 Even a fraction of this benefit would be a wel-
come reform. 
3. Expertise 
Arbitration would likely improve the quality of the disposition 
because arbitrators would have more experience in securities dis-
putes than federal judges. In securities class actions between 1996 
and 2011, 160 judges ruled on summary judgment motions. 103 For 
133 of those judges (83%) it was the first time ever handling sum-
mary judgment in a securities class action. 104 Only eight judges had 
ruled on three securities class action summary judgment motions in 
their entire career, and no judge had ruled on more than three. 105 
If firms increasingly opt-in to arbitration, it is likely that a rela-
tively small number of arbitrators would handle most of the cases. 
The parties would benefit from increased expertise, which would 
lead to more thoughtful rulings and decrease the costs of educating 
the adjudicator. 
A third benefit of expertise is consistency. With fewer decision 
makers, the results would be more consistent, suffering less from 
the natural variations that occur when there are a large number of 
decision makers. This added consistency would increase fairness by 
ensuring that similar companies are treated similarly for similar acts. 
It would also increase the predictability of the outcome. Because 
most judges have ruled on only a handful of these cases in their ca-
reers, it is difficult for litigants to predict how the judge might view 
the case. The judge's view of the case directly determines settlement 
values, and if the value is more difficult to determine, the parties are 
102. I reach this figure by assuming the average securities class action takes 4.1 years to 
reach a disposition. See RYAN & SIMMONS, supra note 99. I calculate the total time in arbitration 
by dividing 4.1 by 2.78. See Eisenberg & Hill, supra note 100. 
103. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 23, at 20 fig.18. This figure is limited to sum-
mary judgment motions, though the broader point holds true for initial filings. In total 843 
judges presided over filed securities class actions. Of those, 582 judges (69%) had worked on 
three or less, and only 65 judges (8%) had worked on ten or more. Id. at 19 fig.17. 
104. I d. at 20 fig.18. 
105. Id. 
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more likely to have different views of what the case is worth. Arbi-
trators specializing in shareholder litigation would have a track rec-
ord that would allow better outcome prediction, leading to better 
case valuations and increasing the chance of settlement. 
4. Customization improves the overall balance 
The current private enforcement framework is an attempt to bal-
ance the costs and benefits of shareholder litigation. Theoretically, 
this framework could be optimized by increasing the level of en-
forcement until the marginal costs of enforcement equal its marginal 
benefits for the average firm. The problem is that very few firms are 
the average firm. 
For example, 94.2% of mergers now lead to litigation. 106 So 
shareholders in a firm that is actively engaged in mergers and acqui-
sitions face a higher than average litigation cost. Unless there is 
some reason to expect higher than average benefits from this type of 
litigation, the balance is way off. My proposal would allow share-
holders at merger-oriented firms to limit merger-related suits to ar-
bitration while allowing other suits to reach the courts. This would 
correct the balance on a company-by-company basis. 
Likewise, studies show that share price and volatility are better 
predictors of litigation risk than corporate governance measures. 107 
A firm in a volatile industry could require a larger drop in sharehold-
er price before the claim would be allowed out of arbitration. 
This principle applies equally well to any characteristic that leads 
to a disproportionate amount of litigation. The corporation's share-
holders could isolate the characteristic and reduce the litigation to a 
proper balance. 
Enforcement customization is already well established in other 
areas of securities law. For example, well-known seasoned issuers 
are subject to looser enforcement when filing shelf registration 
statements. 108 Allowing customization of shareholder litigation is a 
continuation of this philosophy. 
I 06. CAIN & DAVIDOFF, supra note 31. 
107. Talley, supra note 38, at 349-52, 363-66. 
108. 17 C.F.R. § 239.13(d) (2007); id. § 230.415. 
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5. Advantages over other reform proposals 
This proposal has several advantages over prior reform pro-
posals. It improves the current system by weeding out bad suits 
quickly and cost-effectively. It is an improvement upon rigid reforms 
because it is customized on a company-by-company basis to set a 
better balance between over- and under-enforcement. It is also supe-
rior to the more flexible reforms, such as those employing gatekeep-
ers. There is virtually no threat of capture or political distortions, 
and because the shareholders serve as their own gatekeepers, the 
system would not require public funds; on the contrary, the public 
would save money by shifting from publicly funded courts into pri-
vate arbitration. 
6. Director overreaching, deterrence, and compensation 
We may be concerned that the corporations will set the wrong 
balance, pushing everything into arbitration and thereby eliminating 
any deterrence or compensatory effect those suits now have. In other 
words, we may be worry that management may grant itself a license 
to commit fraud. 
This concern is not troubling for two reasons. First, as explained 
above, shareholder litigation has few benefits now, so there is not 
much deterrent or compensatory benefit to lose. 109 
Second, there is no reason to think shareholders or management 
would set such an extreme balance. If shareholders set the balance, it 
is not clear why we should second-guess their decision to limit their 
own remedy. And it is unlikely that management would implement 
overly broad arbitration provisions because, frankly, they have no 
dog in that fight. 
Shareholder litigation is not a fight between management and 
shareholders; damages are paid by the shareholders or the insurance 
company, not by management. Whether the suit is litigated or arbi-
trated, whether it succeeds or fails, managers still get to keep their 
yachts. 110 Because management is rationally apathetic to shareholder 
litigation, it is not clear why we should expect them to spend politi-
1 09. See supra Part ll. R.2. 
110. See supra text accompanying note 29. 
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cal capital to push an unpopular arbitration provision. 1 1 1 In short, 
managers will not try to throw off the constraints of shareholder liti-
gation because shareholder litigation imposes no constraints. 
Pfizer Inc. and Gannett Co., Inc. have recently provided wonder-
ful evidence of rational managerial apathy to shareholder suits. Don-
ald and Susan Vuchetich owned stock in both Pfizer and Gannett and 
sought to include in the companies' proxy materials an arbitration 
provision requiring arbitration of direct and derivative claims. 112 The 
companies sought to exclude the provision, which the SEC allowed, 
finding that "there [was] some basis for [the] view that implementa-
tion of the proposal would cause the company to violate the federal 
securities laws." 113 The companies also argued that because the pro-
vision was untested, it was likely to lead to litigation. 
Pfizer's and Gannett's management showed that they would ra-
ther be subject to shareholder litigation than litigate whether the ar-
bitration provision was enforceable. This suggests managerial am-
bivalence to shareholder litigation and undercuts arguments that 
managers will overreach with arbitration provisions. 
7. Corporate favoritism 
The most common complaint against arbitration is that it favors 
corporations over consumers. The argument is that the corporation 
is a repeat player, so the arbitrator, recognizing who butters his 
bread, unfairly tips the scales against consumers. 114 
There are several problems with this argument as applied to 
shareholder litigation. First, several studies show just the opposite. 
Consumers win more frequently in arbitration than in litigation, pay 
fewer fees, and wait less time for a resolution. 1 15 
1 11. Five companies just proved this point, dropping from their bylaws an unpopular pro-
vision that would have required all shareholder suits to be brought in Delaware. See Brian JM 
Quinn, Firms Surrender on Exclusive Forum Bylaw, M & A L. PROF. BLOG (Mar. 24, 2012), http:/ I 
I a wprofe ssors. type pad. com/ m ergers/2 0 12/0 3 I firm s-s urrend er -on-exclusive-forum-bylaw .h tml. 
112. Gannett Co., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2011 WL 6859124 (Feb. 22, 2012); Pfizer 
Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2012 WL 587597 (Feb. 22, 2012). 
113. Gannett Co., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2011 WL 6859124 (Feb. 22, 2012); Pfizer 
Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2012 WL 587597 (Feb. 22, 2012). 
114. See Sarah H. Cole & Kristen M. Blankley, Empirical Research on Consumer Arbitration: 
What the Data Reveals, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1051, 1053, 1053 n.l4 (listing common complaints 
about arbitration). 
115. Sarah Rudolph Cole, On Babies and Bathwater: The Arbitration Fairness Act and the Supreme 
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Second, the shareholders are more likely to benefit from any re-
peat player favoritism. In 2011, 86.2% of class action fraud com-
plaints were filed against a corporation that had not been subject to a 
suit yet that year. 116 Between 1997 and 2010 this figure was slightly 
higher at 89.1%. 117 Very few corporations face more than one class 
action fraud complaint per year. In any given year, only about 2-3% 
of all listed companies face any class action litigation at all. 118 Com-
bining these figures, less than one percent of listed companies are 
repeat players, facing two or more suits in a year. 
On the other side, plaintiffs' counsel is much more likely to be a 
repeat player. One law firm, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd, was 
lead counsel in 52% of federal securities class actions in 2009 and 
33% in 2011. 119 In 2009 the top seven firms served as lead counsel 
in 85% of cases, and in 2010, 91% of cases were led by one of only 
nine firms. 120 
These results are a bit startling. While less than one percent of 
listed companies will face even two of these cases a year, 91% of 
plaintiffs' attorneys will come from just nine firms. 121 Plaintiffs' 
counsel will be the repeat player, so any arbitrator looking to please 
his benefactor will favor plaintiffs, not management. 
8. Protecting shareholders' day in court 
A common complaint about arbitration is that it deprives the lit-
igant of the dignity of having her day in court. This concern is not 
troubling because "most publicly available information is reflected in 
[the] market price [of a share]." 122 Once an arbitration provision is 
adopted, the market price will reflect the arbitration requirement, so 
new purchasers will receive an appropriate price discount (or pay a 
premium) reflecting the value of the arbitration provision. In other 
Court's Recent Arbitration jurisprudence, 48 Hous. L. REV. 457, 472 (2011) (collecting studies). 
116. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 23, at 8. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. at 9. 
119. Id.at21. 
120. Id. 
121. These numbers will likely adjust as shareholder arbitration provisions become more 
common, but there is no reason to suspect that shareholders bringing a suit will turn to a wider 
range of counselors than now. 
122. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988). 
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words, the shareholder sold the value she places on the dignity of go-
ing to court by purchasing at a lower share price. 
Investors who purchased before an arbitration provision was 
adopted either (1) had a chance to vote on the provision, (2) granted 
the board power to unilaterally amend the bylaws, or (3) purchased 
shares at a price that reflected the board's power to unilaterally 
adopt bylaws. So if the stock trades in an efficient market, the share-
holder has already been compensated for the cost of the chance of an 
arbitration provision through the share price. 123 
As former SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt said, "If somebody tells 
you that you're going to have a very different set of remedies if you 
make this investment, and you still want to invest, it seems to me 
government has done its job." 124 
9. Atrophy of the law 
One serious concern of allowing arbitration is the atrophy of 
corporate law. 125 Written opinions are a public good because they 
provide guidance to third parties. Arbitration decisions are nonprec-
edential, and arbitrators usually are not required to write detailed 
opinions. If arbitration becomes widespread, it could slow the devel-
opment of the law because fewer written opinions will be issued. 
This concern will likely have a smaller effect in shareholder liti-
gation than it does in other areas of the law for three reasons. First, 
unlike other disputes, shareholder litigation is already under the eye 
of several watchdogs-the SEC, the exchanges, and FINRA to name 
a few. Any of these groups could require that arbitrators issue writ-
ten opinions or could study the arbitration process and require ad-
justments. The law would continue to develop because these regula-
tors maintain their mandate to protect investors and, like the 
companies themselves, have an incentive to improve the efficiency of 
the capital markets. 
123. See Kidsco 1nc. v. Dinsmore, 674 A.2d 483, 492 (Del. Ch. 1995) ("[W]here a corpora-
tion's by-laws put all on notice that the by-laws may be amended at any time, no vested rights 
can arise that would contractually prohibit an amendment."). 
124. Gordon Smith, Carlyle Abandons Arbitration Provision, THE CONGLOMERATE (Feb. 3, 
2012, 10:26 PM), http:/ /www.theconglomerate.org/2012/02/carlyle-abandons-arbitration-
provision-.html (quoting former SEC chairman Harvey Pitt). 
125. jOHNSON & BRUNET, supra note 73, at 4. 
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Second, this concern is likely overstated. Adoption of arbitration 
provisions will not be universal, as explained above in the section 
discussing director overreaching. 126 
Finally, it is unlikely that this atrophy will be worse than the cur-
rent state of the law in terms of quantity and quality. Litigation cre-
ates very few precedential decisions and does so inefficiently. In 
2011, the Delaware Court of Chancery produced only 23 opinions.127 
The inefficiency is more difficult to see. One hundred eighty-eight 
federal securities class actions were filed in 2011. 128 Between 1996 
and 2011, 60% of federal securities class actions were voluntarily 
dismissed or settled, meaning no appeal was filed so no precedential 
decision was possible. 129 Of the remaining 40%, it is likely that only 
a fraction were appealed, and of those that were appealed, an even 
smaller fraction would garner a full opinion rather than a memoran-
dum disposition that offers little guidance to future parties. 130 It 
takes hundreds of suits to create relatively few precedential deci-
sions; because of this, it is difficult to argue that litigation is a cost-
effective way to create any public benefits. 131 
Along with the low quantity, the quality of these decisions is 
questionable. Judges typically have very little experience handling se-
curities class actions. A study of the careers of judges presiding over 
federal securities class actions in 2011 revealed that not one judge 
had previously ruled on more than three class action summary 
judgment motions. 132 The diverse field of newcomer adjudicators 
likely decreases the quality of new opinions. 133 Certainly Delaware 
126. See supra Part Ill.B.6. 
127. Court of Chancery Opinions and Orders, DELAWARE STATE COURTS (2011), 
http:/ /courts.delaware.gov/opinions/list.aspx?ag=court +of +chancery (sort by description). 
There were also 82 memorandum opinions, 17 master's final reports, 73 letter opinions, and two 
letter decisions. Id. 
128. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 23, at 1. 
129. Id. at 18. 
130. In 2011, 85% of decisions from the federal courts of appeals were unpublished. THE 
STATISTICS DIVISION, jUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 2011 ANNUAL REPORT OF 
THE DIRECTOR 38 tbl.S-3, available at http:/ /www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics 
/JudicialBusiness/2011/JudicialBusiness201l.pdf. 
131. Romano, supra note 33, at 85; see also Jeffrey A. Sanborn, Note, The Rise of'' Shareholder 
Derivative Arbitration" in Public Corporations: In Re Salomon Inc. Shareholders' Derivative Litiga-
tion, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 337, 339 (1996). 
132. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 23, at 19-20. 
133. Id. 
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provides expert judges, but plaintiffs' counsel is increasingly looking 
to file "anywhere but Delaware." 134 
10. Lacks transparency 
A related concern is that arbitration lacks transparency. Trans-
parency is beneficial because it guides future litigants and lawmak-
ers, and it allows reputational damage to the bad actors, which might 
increase the deterrent effect. 135 Arbitration typically lacks transpar-
ency because arbitrators are not required to issue lengthy opinions 
for their rulings, making their reasoning difficult to evaluate. 
The lack of transparency in arbitration is not a virtue, but it is 
not a concern either, because it is no worse than the current situa-
tion. As stated earlier, these actions almost universally settle. 136 To 
criticize arbitration for a lack of transparency, we must compare it to 
the transparency of settlements. 
Like decisions in arbitration, settlements often provide only an 
outcome. Some arbitration provisions, like that recently proposed by 
Carlyle Group, 137 include confidentiality clauses, but any material 
settlement would need to be reported under the Exchange Act. 138 In 
both arbitration and settlement, shareholders see only the outcome 
without any justification. Shareholders are not entitled to review set-
tlement negotiations, board minutes, or internal evaluations. In 
short, the high settlement rate in securities litigation cuts the legs 
out from under any argument opposing arbitration based on trans-
parency. 
134. See Sara Lewis, Note, Transforming the "Anywhere But Chancery" Problem Into the "Nowhere 
But Chancery" Solution, 14 STAN. ].L. Bus. & FIN. 199, 200 (2008). See generally Ted Mirvis, Any-
where But Chancery: Ted Mirvis Sounds an Alarm and Suggests Some Solutions, 7 M&A J. 17 (2007), 
available at http:/ /www.wlrk.com/docs/Mirvis _-_ %20anywhere _but_ chancery.PDF. The South-
ern District of New York also has several judges with expertise in securities regulation, which 
plaintiffs' counsel has the same motivation to avoid. 
135. jOHNSON & BRUNET, supra note 73, at 30. 
136. One commentator has noted that since the PSLRA was passed in 1996, only seven 
securities class actions have reached a jury verdict. See Savett, supra note 90. 
137. The Carlyle Grp. L.P., supra note 95. 
138. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, CURRENT REPORT: PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(0) 
OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 (Form 8-K) Item 1.01. 
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11. Arbitration may not be a good fit for high-stakes disputes 
Because arbitrators are less confined by legal rules, and there are 
fewer options to overturn an erroneous decision, some have specu-
lated that arbitration is poorly suited for high-stakes disputes. 139 
This argument is belied by the large number of high-stakes disputes 
recently submitted to arbitration. Johnson & Johnson and Merck & 
Co. recently paid $500 million to settle a suit in arbitration. 14° Chev-
ron's dispute over Venezuela's nationalization program recently led 
to a $250 million settlement. 141 A quick Google search of "arbitra-
tion million" reveals hundreds of multi-million dollar arbitration 
disputes. 
Even if high-stakes arbitration is risky, it is not clear why it 
should be outlawed. The typical approach, reflected in the business 
judgment rule, is to allow companies the freedom to take risks. 
C. Implementation 
A corporation can form an agreement to arbitrate shareholder 
disputes by adopting a binding arbitration provision in its charter or 
bylaws. While either is likely to be upheld, a charter amendment 
may offer more protection. 
1 . Charters and bylaws bind shareholders 
Delaware treats a corporation's charter and bylaws as contracts 
that bind shareholders, even if unilaterally adopted by the direc-
tors.142 
For example, in Kidsco Inc. v. Dinsmore, the Delaware Court of 
Chancery upheld a bylaw amendment that was unilaterally adopted 
by the directors to delay a hostile acquisition. 143 The hostile bidder 
139. See AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1752 (2011); see also jOHNSON & 
BRUNET, supra note 73, at 23-24. 
140. AT&T, 131 S. Ct. at 1790 (Breyer, ]., dissenting) (citing Peter Loftus, Rivals Resolve 
Dispute Over Drug, WALL ST.]. (Apr. 16, 2011), http:/ /online.wsj.com/article/SBJOOO 142405274 
8704495004576264691589085236.html). 
141. Charlie Devereux & Nathan Crooks, Venezuela Pays Exxon $250 Million to Settle Arbitra-
tion Case, BLOOMllERG BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 17, 2012), http:/ /www.businessweek.com/news/ 
2012-02-17 /venezuela-pays-exxon-250-million-to-settle-arbitration-case .html. 
142. Kidsco Inc. v. Dinsmore, 674 A.2d 483,490 (Del. Ch. 1995). 
143. ld. at 492. 
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had issued a press release, stating that it had begun soliciting share-
holders to call a special meeting to remove the target's board. 144 Lat-
er that day, the directors of the target corporation met, largely by tel-
ephone, and after fifteen minutes of deliberations, amended the 
bylaws to prevent a shareholder meeting from being held within six-
ty days of the date it was requested. 145 This would delay the hostile 
bidder's attempts to replace the board. 
Shareholders supporting the hostile bidder sued, arguing that 
they had a vested right to an earlier meeting because they had al-
ready begun soliciting proxies. 146 They argued that they should not 
be bound by the board's unilateral amendment because the process 
for calling a meeting was already in progress. 147 
Then-Vice Chancellor Jacobs rejected these arguments because 
"although the by-laws are a contract between the corporation and its 
stockholders, the contract was subject to the board's power to 
amend the by-laws unilaterally." 148 The shareholders were bound by 
the unilateral amendment, and the meeting was delayed. 149 
Delaware is not breaking new ground with this holding. Every 
state to address the issue has held that bylaws and charters are con-
tracts binding upon shareholders. Appendix A provides citations for 
forty-three states that have addressed the issue, each finding that the 
bylaws and charter bind shareholders. These holdings go back as far 
as 1844. 150 
The major treatises are also unanimous. The Corpus juris Secun-
dum, 151 the American jurisprudence (Second Edition), 152 and the Fletch-
144. Id. at 489. 
145. I d. 
146. I d. at 490. 
147. I d. 
148. I d. at 492 (internal citations omitted). 
149. See Benihana of Tokyo, Inc. v. Benihana, Inc., 906 A.2d 114, 120 (Del. 2006) ("It is 
settled law that certificates of incorporation are contracts."); CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension 
Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 239 (Del. 2008) (holding that bylaws are a contract). 
150. Susquehanna Ins. Co. v. Perrine, 7 Watts & Serg. 348, 1844 WL 5011, at *2 (Pa. 
1844). 
151. 18 C.j.S. Corporations§ 170 (2011) ("Generally, actions may be brought upon by-laws 
operating as contracts between a corporation and its members or third persons, by the parties 
thereto."). 
152. 18 AM.)UR. 2d Corporations§ 14 (2011). 
97 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2013 
er Cyclopedia of the Law of Corporations153 all treat bylaws and charters 
as an agreement binding upon shareholders. 
This result makes sense. A corporation's charter contains the 
rights and limitations on the stock, including mandatory dividends, 
liquidation preferences, and participation rights. 154 These protec-
tions would be meaningless if charter provisions could not be en-
forced against the corporation or against fellow shareholders. 
Likewise, bylaw provisions can regulate such things as when a 
special meeting of shareholders may be called. 155 If these were not 
enforceable against shareholders, they would also be meaningless. 
2. Whether to use a charter or bylaw 
For Delaware156 corporations, an arbitration agreement is more 
likely to be upheld if it is included in the charter rather than the by-
laws. Delaware requires a shareholder vote to amend the charter. 157 
In contrast, bylaws may be amended by the directors without a 
shareholder vote if the charter allows it, so the case for enforcing an 
arbitration bylaw against shareholders is weaker. However, courts 
are likely to uphold even a unilaterally adopted bylaw. 158 
a. Charter. A charter provision is the most natural place for an 
arbitration provision. A corporation's charter may contain "any 
provision creating, defining, limiting and regulating the powers of 
the corporation, the directors, and the stockholders." 159 This broad 
language would permit an arbitration clause to be included in the 
charter. 
A recent case from the Delaware Court of Chancery supports this 
conclusion. The court suggested that companies use a charter 
153. 8 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 
§ 4198 (rev. vol. 2012). 
154. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § l02(a)(4) (1998). 
155. See Kidsco v. Dinsmore, 674 A.2d 483, 492 (Del. Ch. 1995). 
156. I focus on Delaware law because about 60% of public companies are incorporated 
there. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms' Decisions Where to Incorporate, 46 ].L. & EcoN. 
383, 391, 395 (2003); see also Lewis, supra note 134. 
157. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(a), (a)(3), (b) (1998). 
158. See Kidsco, 674 A.2d at 492. 
159. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(l) (1998). 
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amendment for forum selection clauses. 160 Although the court did 
not refer directly to arbitration, arbitration agreements are typically 
analyzed as forum selection clauses, 161 so the provision would likely 
be upheld under Delaware law. 
b. Bylaws. An arbitration provision could also be included in the 
corporation's bylaws, 162 but there are several reasons this is riskier 
than including it in the charter. 
First, Delaware requires that the "rights" and "limitations" on 
shares be listed in the charter. 163 If an arbitration provision creates a 
right or limitation on the shares, it would need to be included in the 
charter. The Supreme Court has rejected the view that arbitration af-
fects the substantive rights of the parties, so a litigant would proba-
bly be unable to argue that an arbitration provision affects the rights 
or limitations on the shares. 164 
Second, if the bylaw is enacted by the directors without the vote 
of shareholders, it weakens the argument that the shareholders con-
sented to arbitration. Economically, this shouldn't matter. Once the 
bylaw amendment is adopted, the market price will reflect the arbi-
tration requirement, so new purchasers will have received a com-
mensurate price discount (or paid a premium). 165 Those who held 
the stock before the bylaw was adopted either approved the charter 
160. In re Revlon, Inc. S'holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960 (Del. Ch. 2010) ("[I]fboards of 
directors and stockholders believe that a particular forum would provide an efficient and value-
promoting locus for dispute resolution, then corporations are free to respond with charter provi-
sions selecting an exclusive forum for intra-entity disputes."). 
161. See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 482-83 
(1989) ("[A ]rbitration agreements ... are 'in effect, a specialized kind of forum-selection 
clause."') (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974)); see also Mitsubishi 
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 630 (1985) ("[A]n agreement to 
arbitrate before a specified tribunal [is], in effect, a specialized kind of forum-selection clause 
that posits not only the situs of suit but also the procedure to be used in resolving the dispute.") 
(quoting Scherk, 417 U.S. at 519). 
162. In Delaware, bylaws can address any issue "relating to the business of the corpora-
tion, the conduct of its affairs, and its rights or powers or the rights or powers of its stockhold-
ers, directors, officers or employees," as long as the provision does not contradict the charter or 
violate the law. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (1998). 
163. Td. § 102(a)(4). 
164. See Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 486 (" [R]esort to the arbitration process does not 
inherently undermine any of the substantive rights afforded to petitioners under the Securities 
Act.") (emphasis added). 
165. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246 (1988). 
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provision that gave the board power to unilaterally amend the bylaws 
or they purchased the stock at a price that reflected this power. 166 So 
if the stock trades in an efficient market, lack of shareholder rartici-
pation probably won't defeat an arbitration bylaw provision. 1 7 Still, 
one court has found shareholder approval to be relevant in an analo-
gous context. 168 
Third, if the bylaw is adopted unilaterally by the shareholders, it 
may violate Section 141 (a) of the Delaware General Corporation 
Law, which prohibits shareholder bylaws that substantively limit the 
board's managerial authority. 169 Because arbitration is procedural, 170 
not substantive, 171 this argument likely fails. 
Practically speaking, if the shareholders are intent on an arbitra-
tion provision, it seems unlikely that management, which is rational-
ly apathetic to shareholder litigation, 172 would object. The better 
practice is to include the provision in the charter and avoid the fight. 
Fourth, a shareholder-adopted arbitration bylaw would be void if 
it prohibited directors from exercising their fiduciary duties. 173 This 
probably is not a problem. A reviewing court evaluates the bylaw as 
applied to the facts of the case, presumes the bylaw is valid, and if 
possible, construes it so that it does not violate the law. 174 So a chal-
lenger would have to show that arbitration of the current dispute vi-
olates the directors' fiduciary duties. Given the benefits of arbitra-
tion, this is unlikely to succeed. 
166. See Lewis, supra note 134, at 212. 
167. See Kidsco Inc. v. Dinsmore, 674 A.2d 483, 492 (Del. Ch. 1995) ("[W]here a corpora-
tion's by-laws put all on notice that the by-laws may be amended at any time, no vested rights 
can arise that would contractually prohibit an amendment."). 
168. See Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1175 (N.D. Cal. 2011) ("Certainly were a 
majority of shareholders to approve such a[n] ... amendment [limiting the forum to Dela-
ware], the arguments for treating the venue provision like those in commercial contracts would 
be much stronger, even in the case of a plaintiff shareholder who had personally voted against 
the amendment."). 
169. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 234, 234 n.l I (Del. 2008). 
170. !d. at 235. 
171. A bylaw is procedural if it "establishes or regulates a process for substantive director 
decision-making." Id. It is substantive if it "mandates the decision itself." Id. Arbitration does 
not determine liability; it defines only the process used to establish liability, so it is likely proce-
dural. 
172. See supra text accompanying note 97. 
173. CA. Inc., 953 A.2d at 238. 
174. Id. 
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IV. LIKELY RESPONSES 
Arbitration of shareholder disputes is likely to cause some ener-
getic responses from regulators, legislators, and the plaintiffs' bar. 
A. SEC Approval and the Legality of Arbitration Under the Securities Laws 
Because arbitration provisions seem most likely to first appear in 
the charters of companies preparing for an initial public offering, 
which must be approved by the SEC, I begin with an analysis of 
whether the SEC would approve an arbitration provision. In 1990, 
the SEC rejected a registration statement of a company whose char-
ter included an arbitration provision. More recently, while this paper 
was in draft, the SEC nixed an arbitration provision in the charter of 
Carlyle Group before allowing the S-1 to become effective. 175 
The SEC's opposition stems from Section 29(a) of the Exchange 
Act. Section 29(a) makes void any waiver of compliance with the Ex-
change Act. 176 This chapter includes the statutes regulating federal 
securities class actions, 177 so waiver of the right to class action litiga-
tion is seen as a waiver of compliance with the chapter. 
The SEC's argument relies on the premise that arbitrating claims 
under the Exchange Act is a waiver of compliance with the Exchange 
Act. The Supreme Court expressly rejected this position in Shear-
son/American Express Inc. v. McMahon. 178 
1. Shear son/ American Express Inc. v. McMahon 
In Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, two investors sued 
their broker for, among other things, violating the Exchange Act's 
anti-fraud provisions-section 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5. 179 These are 
175. An SEC spokesman said, "We advised [Carlyle] that the staff was not prepared to 
clear the filing with the mandatory-arbitration provision included." Miles Weiss et al., Carlyle 
Drops Class-Action Lawsuit Ban as Opposition Mounts, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 4, 2012), http://www. 
bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-03/carlyle-drops-class-action-lawsuit-ban.html. 
176. "Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive compliance 
with any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder, or of any rule of an 
exchange required thereby shall be void." 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (2012). 
177. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2012). 
178. 482 u.s. 220, 227-28 (1987). 
179. !d. at 223. 
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the same sections that form the basis of most securities class ac-
tions.180 
The broker invoked the mandatory arbitration clause in the bro-
kerage agreement. 181 The district court ordered arbitration on the 
Exchange Act claims, 182 and the circuit court reversed. 183 The Su-
preme Court granted certiorari and held that the Exchange Act 
claims were arbitrable. 184 
The question was whether the Federal Arbitration Act (the 
"FAA") applied to Exchange Act claims. 185 The FAA makes arbitra-
tion agreements "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such 
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any con-
tract."186 
The Court held that the FAA presumptively allows arbitration of 
statutory rights, so arbitration agreements are enforceable unless the 
challengers show "Congress intended to make an exception to the 
[Federal] Arbitration Act for claims arising under . . . the Ex-
change Act, an intention discernible from the text, history, or pur-
poses of the statute."187 
Turning to the statutory text, the Court first considered whether 
Section 29 (a) created an exception to the FAA. 188 Section 29 (a) 
would be triggered only if the arbitration provision waived compli-
ance with the Exchange Act, so the question was whether the arbi-
tration provision waived compliance with any part of the Exchange 
Act. 
The investors pointed out that Section 27 of the Exchange Act 
grants exclusive jurisdiction over Exchange Act claims to the district 
courts. 189 They argued that because the arbitration provision grants 
180. Baker and Griffith found that ninety-three percent of securities class actions brought 
in 2005 alleged fraud, specifically violations of Rule lOb-S under the Exchange Act of 1934. 
Baker & Griffith, supra note 16, at 498 . 
181. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 223. 
182. Id. at 224. 
183. Id. at 224-25. 
184. Id. at 242. 
185. Id. at 226-27. 
186. 9 u.s.c. § 2 (2012). 
187. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 227. 
188. Id. at 227. 
189. Id. Section 27 of the Exchange Act states thP following: 
The district courts of the United States ... shall have exclusive jurisdiction of viola-
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jurisdiction to arbitrators rather than district courts, it violates Sec-
tion 27, making the arbitration provision void under Section 29 (a). 
The Court disagreed. It held that Section 29 (a) prohibits waiver 
only of the "substantive obligations imposed by the Exchange 
Act." 190 Because the jurisdictional statute did not create a substan-
tive obligation, the arbitration provision did not waive a substantive 
obligation, and Section 29 was never triggered. "[W]here arbitration 
does provide an adequate means of enforcing the provisions of the 
Exchange Act,§ 29(a) does not void a predispute waiver of§ 27." 191 
Next, the investors argued that the arbitration provision waived 
compliance with the substantive protections of the Exchange Act. 192 
The Court rejected this broader argument, holding that "[b ]y agree-
ing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substan-
tive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution 
in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum." 193 That is, because the 
arbitration provision was merely a change in forum, it did not affect 
substantive rights, so there was no waiver of compliance, and Sec-
tion 29 (a) was not triggered. 
Next the Court addressed the suitability of arbitration for Ex-
change Act claims, addressing the investors' argument that arbitra-
tion weakened their protections. 194 The Court pointed out that the 
SEC approved the arbitration procedures that were adopted by the 
exchanges and invoked by the broker agreement. 195 It held that 
"where, as in this case, the prescribed procedures are subject to the 
[SEC's] authority [over self-regulatory organizations], an arbitration 
agreement does not effect a waiver of the protections of the [Ex-
tions of this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder, and of all suits in equity 
and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this chapter or 
the rules and regulations thereunder. . . Any suit or action to enforce any liability 
or duty created by this chapter or rules and regulations thereunder, or to enjoin any 
violation of such chapter or rules and regulations, may be brought in any such district 
or in the district wherein the defendant is found or is an inhabitant or transacts busi-
ness, and process in such cases may be served in any other district of which the de-
fendant is an inhabitant or wherever the defendant may be found. 
15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2012). 
190. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 228. 
191. Jd. at 229. 
192. Id. 
193. Jd. at 229-30. 
194. I d. at 231-34. 
195. Id. at 234. 
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change] Act." 196 This point was reemphasized in the conclusion: 
"[W]here the SEC has sufficient statutory authority to ensure that 
arbitration is adequate to vindicate Exchange Act rights, enforce-
ment does not effect a waiver ... under§ 29(a)." 197 
Having rejected each of the investors' arguments, the Supreme 
Court held that claims under the Exchange Act were subject to pre-
dispute arbitration agreements. 198 
2. SEC approved procedures 
Applying McMahon's holdings to arbitration of shareholder dis-
putes, only one of the investors' arguments creates some pause. The 
Court ruled that an arbitration provision did not necessarily violate 
the substantive protections of the Exchange Act because the arbitra-
tion procedures were subject to SEC review. 199 This implies that a 
firm hoping to adopt an arbitration provision increases its chances of 
a favorable ruling by deferring to procedures that the SEC has adopt-
ed. 
Finding such a regime may be tricky. The majority of securities 
fraud arbitration claims are filed with FINRA, 200 and FINRA's arbi-
tration provisions specifically prohibit class-wide arbitration, requir-
ing that each claimant's case be arbitrated separately, a process 
known as bilateral arbitration.201 The NYSE,202 NYSE Arca,203 and 
NYSE Amex204 each defer to FINRA's rules, and the NASDAQ205 
196. Jd. 
197. Id. at 238. 
198. Id. 
199. Jd. 
200. Arbitration Procedures, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov 
/answers/arbproc.htm (last modified Feb. 07, 2011). 
201. FJNRA Rules 12204(a), 13204(a), FINRA MANUAL, http://finra.complinet.com/en/ 
display/display_ main.html?rbid =2403&element_id=607 (last visited Oct. 31, 2012). 
202. Arbitration Rules, Rule 600A, NYSE RULES, http:/ /rules.nyse.com/NYSETools 
/bookmark.asp?id=sx-policymanual-nyseArbitrationRulesR600A639&manual=/nyse/rules/ 
nyse-rules/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2012). 
203. Rule 12 Arbitration, NYSE ARCA RULES, http:/ /usequities.nyx.com/arca-regulation/ 
rules-interpretations/area-rules (last visited Oct. 31, 2012). 
204. Arbitration Rules, Rule 600, NYSE MKT RULES, http://wallstreet.cch.com/ AMEXtools/ 
PlatformViewer.asp?SelectedNode=chp _1_ 4&manual=/ AMEX/rules/amex-rules/ (last visited 
Oct. 31, 2012). 
205. Equity Rules, Rule 3110(/)(6), NASDAQ STOCK MARKET RULES, http://nasdaq.cch 
wallstreet.com/NASDAQTools/Platform Viewer.asp?selectednode =chp _1_1_ 3 _ 2&manual = %2F 
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and Chicago Stock Exchange206 require that arbitration agreements 
exclude class actions. In short, the SEC has not approved procedures 
for class-wide arbitration.207 
Some clarification by the SEC would be helpful, but an exact 
match may not be necessary. Later in the McMahon opinion, the 
Court reaffirmed that "potential complexity should not suffice to 
ward off arbitration."208 If the procedures are already calibrated to be 
fair to the parties, expanding the arbitration to a class action is just 
an increase in complexity, which may be insufficient to defeat arbi-
tration. 209 
Later rulings by the Court suggest that the SEC's approval of the 
arbitration process is not necessary. Two years after McMahon held 
that Exchange Act claims are arbitral, the Court held that claims un-
der the Securities Act of 1933 are arbitral in Rodriguez De Quijas v. 
Shearson/American Express Inc., overruling an earlier decision.210 
In doing so it never discussed whether the arbitration procedures 
were subject to the SEC's regulatory authority.2 ll Instead, the Court 
treated the arbitration agreement as a forum selection clause, 212 
holding that " [ t] here is nothing in the record before us, nor in the 
facts of which we can take judicial notice, to indicate that the arbitral 
system . . . would not afford the plaintiff the rights to which he is 
entitled."213 
nasdaq%2Fmain%2Fnasdaq-equityrules%2F (last visited Oct. 3 I, 2012). 
206. Article 14, Rule 2, Section l (c), CHI. STOCK EXCHANGE, 
http:/ /www.chx.com/content/Participanr_lnformation/Downloadahk_ Docs/Rules/Rules_ CHX_ 
07302012.pdf (lase updated July 30, 2012). 
207. See Order Approving Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Exclusion of Class Ac-
tions From Arbitration Proceedings, 57 Fed. Reg. 52,659, .52,660 (Oct. 28, 1992). 
208. Shear son/ Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 239 (1987) (quoting 
lv1itsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 633 ( 1985)). 
209. Rut see AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750-51 (2011) (high-
lighting the differences between bilateral and class arbitration). 
210. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 47'7 (1989). 
211. They were though. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Lehman Bros., Inc., 845 F .2d 
1296, 1297 n.2 (5th Cir. 1988), rev'd 490 U.S. 477 (1989). The agreement relied on NASD's ar-
bitration rules. NASD is now FINRA, so it relied on the rules used for the majority of securities 
claims. 
212. Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 481. 
213. Id. at 483 (quoting Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 439 (1953)(Frankfurter,]., dissent-
ing)). 
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Addressing investor protection a second time, the Court again 
declined to address SEC oversight and instead looked to the FAA's 
saving clause, which nullifies arbitration agreements obtained "from 
the sort of fraud or overwhelming economic power that would pro-
vide grounds 'for the revocation of any contract."'214 
In its conclusion, the Court reiterated a third time that "resort to 
the arbitration process does not inherently undermine any of the 
substantive rights afforded to petitioners under the Securities Act," 
again endorsing arbitration generally without regard to whether the 
SEC approved the procedures.215 While the Court specifically re-
ferred to SEC approved procedures, it seems likely that if a corpora-
tion adopts the arbitration provisions of any generally accepted pro-
gram, those procedures would be upheld. 
A narrower reading-one that would permit only those proce-
dures approved by the SEC-would lead to a perverse result. The 
SEC has not approved any procedures allowing for classwide arbitra-
tion; however, FINRA's rules permit bilateral arbitration. The SEC 
has regulatory authority over FINRA's arbitration procedures, so an 
arbitration agreement invoking them would likely be affirmed under 
McMahon. So if SEC-approved procedures are required, a company 
would be free to adopt bilateral arbitration, relying on FINRA's 
rules, but would be prohibited from adopting classwide arbitration, 
which has not been SEC approved.216 This result is absurd because 
bilateral arbitration is effectively a one-man securities suit, so the 
costs will easily outweigh the benefits. So in an attempt to preserve 
shareholder litigation from arbitration, such a ruling would eliminate 
shareholder litigation altogether. 
In the end, SEC approval may be a matter of politics more than 
statutory interpretation. After the SEC shot down Carlyle's arbitra-
tion provision, Harvey Pitt, the SEC Chairman under President 
214. Id. at 483-84 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 
u.s. 614, 627 (1985)). 
215. Jd. at 485-86. 
216. It is worth noting that the Supreme Court recently held that contracts may require 
bilateral--rather than class-wide-arbitration even for claims that could legally be litigated as a 
class. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011). 
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George W. Bush, said "[i]t would have passed on my commis-
sion."217 A company looking to include a shareholder arbitration 
provision may just need to wait for a new chairman. 
B. Legislative Response and the Limits on State Power 
If the SEC permits arbitration, there is likely to be some legisla-
tive backlash. Professors Johnson and Brunet have set out a wonder-
ful list of bills and letters from congressmen seeking to limit arbitra-
tion.218 Populist and judicial outrage at arbitration is why the FAA 
was passed to begin with.219 
When Carlyle's arbitration provision hit the press, several con-
gressmen openly opposed allowing arbitration of shareholder dis-
putes. Senator Blumenthal said the provision would "eviscerate 
shareholder rights."220 Representative Ackerman spoke less strongly 
but agreed it would cause shareholders to forfeit their rights, adding, 
"It should not be allowed to happen."221 
Because the FAA is the basis for most arbitration enforcement, 
legislative attempts to stop arbitration of shareholder disputes would 
likely be effective only on the federal level. The reform would likely 
be controversial, making it unlikely to succeed in a divided Congress. 
State legislatures, which face less publicity, may have the politi-
cal leeway to pass legislation, but any state legislation would likely 
be ineffective. My proposal would insert the arbitration provision in-
to a corporation's charter or bylaws, which are governed by state law. 
Contract law applies to the interpretation of charters and bylaws, 
which is also state law. But these state law issues are constrained by 
the FAA and the internal affairs doctrine. 
217. Weiss, supra note 175. 
218. jOHNSON & BRUNET, supra note 73, at 10. I highly recommend this piece for those 
studying arbitration of shareholder litigation. The paper is filled with insightful nuggets of wis-
dom. 
219. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270, 280 (1982) (quoting H.R. 
REP. No. 97-542, at 13 (1982)); see also Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. ofTrs. of the Leland Stanford 
junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
220. Weiss, supra note 46. 
221. !d. 
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1. The Federal Arbitration Act's limits on state laws 
Under the FAA, states retain power to apply traditional contract 
defenses.222 "Thus state law, whether of legislative or judicial origin, 
is applicable if that law arose to govern issues concernin~ the validi-
ty, revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally." 23 
However, any law attempting to make an arbitration provision in 
a charter unenforceable would have to be "generally applicable."224 It 
could not "rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate" as 
the basis for finding a contract unenforceable.225 This prohibits laws 
that discriminate against arbitration directly or that "disproportion-
ate [ly] impact" arbitration. 226 It is difficult to imagine that any state 
law limiting arbitration of shareholder disputes could avoid these 
pitfalls. 
Also, the state law cannot target charters and bylaws specifically. 
Circuit courts have expanded the "generally applicable" requirement 
to strike down state laws that apply unique rules to certain types of 
contracts, such as franchise contracts, when those laws are applied to 
contracts containing an arbitration provision?27 They have reasoned 
I d. 
222. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). Section 2 states the following: 
A wntten provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transac-
tion involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out 
of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part 
thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy 
arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and 
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation 
of any contract. 
223. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S 483, 492 n.9 (1987). 
224. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011). 
225. rd. at 1747 (quoting Perry, 482 U.S. at 492 n.9). 
226. ld. at 1747 (criticizing procedures that apply to both arbitration and litigation yet 
have a disproportionate impact on arbitration agreements). 
227. See: Bradley v. Harris Research, Inc., 275 F.3d 884, 890 (9th Cir. 2001); KKW Enters., 
Inc. v. Gloria jean's Gourmet Coffee Franchising Corp., 184 F.3d 42, 51 (lst Cir. 1999) (holding 
that the FAA preempts a Rhode Island statute prohibiting franchise agreements from selecting 
forums outside Rhode Island because the statute is not generally applicable; it is applicable only 
to franchise agreements); Doctor's Assocs. v. Hamilton, ISO F.3d 157, 163 (2d Cir. 1998) (same 
for New jersey law); Mgmt. Recruiters Int'l, Inc. v. Bloor, 129 F.3d 851, 856 (6th Cir. I 997) 
(doubting that the FAA would allow a state law requiring in-state arbitration); Mitchell v. Am. 
Fair Credit Ass'n, 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 193, 202-03 (Ct. App. 2002) (collecting circuit cases). 
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that because the statute does not apply to every contract, it is not 
generally applicable. 228 
Furthermore, state law cannot invalidate the agreement through 
clever interpretations. A court may not "in assessing the rights of lit-
igants to enforce an arbitration agreement, construe that agreement 
in a manner different from that in which it otherwise construes 
nonarbitration agreements under state law."229 The same principles 
of contract interpretation must apply. 
With these limitations, it seems unlikely that a state could pre-
vent enforcement of an arbitration provision in a company's charter 
or bylaws. Doing so would require a modification to its entire con-
tract regime, which is more risky than it is worth. 
2. The internal affairs doctrine's limits on state laws 
Even if a state could craft a law to circumvent the FAA, it likely 
would not matter. Sixty percent of corporations are incorporated in 
Delaware, 230 and the internal affairs doctrine requires courts resolv-
ing disputes about the adoption or interpretation of charter and by-
law amendments to apply the law of the state of incorporation. 231 
Thus, even if California modified its laws, Delaware law would likely 
apply. 
However, because the internal affairs doctrine is a state choice of 
law provision, each state can choose whether to follow it. Most do, 
but New York and California have carved out exceptions. 
New York applies its own statutes to foreign corporations but 
will not apply most of its provisions232 to corporations that are listed 
228. See supra note 227. 
229. Perry, 482 U.S. at 492 n.9. 
230. Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 156, at 391, 395; see also Lewis, supra note 134. 
231. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS§ 302, cmt. a (1971). The restate-
ment provides the following: 
Matters falling within the scope of the rule of this Section [which defers to the state 
of incorporation] and which involve primarily a corporation's relationship to its 
shareholders include ... the adoption of by-laws, ... shareholders' rights to 
examine corporate records, charter and by-law amendments, mergers, consolida-
tions and reorganizations and the reclassification of shares. 
ld.; see also id. at cmt. e (suggesting that whether an amendment was validly adopted is a ques-
tion of Delaware law). 
232. One provision that always applies is the right to bring a derivative suit. N.Y. Bus. 
CORP. LAW§ 1319(a) (McKinney 2011). However, any restrictions on arbitration of this suit are 
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on a national securities exchange233 or those that have less than half 
of their income allocable to New York for state tax purposes.234 Be-
cause targets of shareholder litigation are almost always listed on a 
national exchange, New York law probably would not apply. 
California is the state most likely to be hostile to an arbitration 
provision in a charter or bylaw. The state usually applies the internal 
affairs doctrine but occasionally limits it through cases or stat-
utes.235 Like New York, California does not apply its own laws to 
corporations listed on the NYSE or NASDAQ exchanges.236 Califor-
nia also expressly defers to the state of incorporation for suits 
against directors for breach of an official duty, which covers nearly 
all shareholder litigation. 237 
The Delaware Supreme Court has held that applying another 
state's law to the internal affairs of Delaware corporations violates 
the federal constitution's due process clause and dormant commerce 
clause.238 California, of course, disagrees,239 so the internal affairs 
doctrine is not the most reliable limitation. 
C. Plaintiffs' Attorneys' Response and the Applicability of Traditional 
Defenses in Contract and Equity 
The plaintiffs' bar is the most likely to fight fiercely against arbi-
tration. Plaintiffs' attorneys will likely find a client to bring a suit to 
block enforcement. This section analyzes various contract defenses 
that may be argued.240 
likely preempted by the FAA. 
233. See id. § 1320(a) (1). 
234. See id. § 1320(a). 
235. CAL. CORP. CODE§ 239 (West 2012). 
236. Seeid. § 2115(c). 
237. See id. § 2116. But see supra Part II.B. I. 
238. VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108, 1113 (Del. 
2005). Rosenmiller v. Bordes, 607 A.2d 465, 468 (Del. Ch. 1991) (including the full faith and 
credit clause as well). But see Note, The Internal Affairs Doctrine: Theoretical justifications and Tentative 
Explanations for Its Continued Primacy, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1480, 1490-96 (2002) (criticizing this 
position). 
239. See Friese v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 558, 568-69 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005); see 
also Valtz v. Penta lnv. Corp., 139 Cal. App. 3d 803, 807 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); Lewis, supra note 
134. 
240. Because defenses differ from state to state, this section focuses on those defenses 
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As stated above, the FAA preempts any defense that is not "gen-
erally applicable,"241 meaning it cannot "rely on the uniqueness of 
an agreement to arbitrate" as the basis for finding a contract unen-
forceable.242 Defenses cannot discriminate against arbitration direct-
ly or "disproportionate[ly] impact" arbitration.243 Under this doc-
trine, only defenses focused on how a provision was adopted and 
whom it binds will survive. 
There are also three practical barriers when enforcing state law de-
fenses to prevent arbitration. The simplest is that the party challenging 
arbitration bears the burden of showing that the defense applies. 244 
More formidable is the strong policy favoring arbitration. 245 
Once a court finds an agreement to arbitrate, 246 that agreement 
found in the Restatement or in Delaware law, which likely applies under the internal affairs doc-
trine. 
241. Lewis, supra note 134. 
242. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1747 (quoting Perryv. Thomas, 
482 U.S. 483,493 n.9 (1987)). 
243. Id. (criticizing procedures that apply to both arbitration and litigation yet have a dis-
proportionate impact on arbitration agreements). 
244. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477,483 (1989). 
245. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. I, 24 (1983); see also 
Perry, 482 U.S. at 489 ("Section 2, therefore, embodies a clear federal policy of requiring arbitra-
tion unless the agreement to arbitrate is not part of a contract evidencing interstate commerce or 
is revocable 'upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."'). 
But see Gotham Holdings, LP v. Health Grades, Inc., 580 F.3d 664, 666 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding 
that there is no policy favoring arbitration, just a policy of favoring the enforcement of con-
tracts); LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, RHETORIC VERSUS REALITY IN ARBITRATION jURISPRUDENCE: 
How THE SUPREME COURT FLAUNTS AND FLUNKS CONTRACTS 5 (Paul D. Butler & Scott B. Pagel 
eds., 2011), available at http:/ /ssrn.com/abstract= 1809005 (arguing that the Supreme Court's 
policy favoring arbitration removes it from true contract law principles). 
246. Courts have not always applied this preference at the same analytical stage. Some 
courts apply the policy preference only to defenses. See, e.g., Am. United Logistics, Inc. v. 
Catellus Dev. Corp., 319 F.3d 921, 929 (7th Cir. 2003); AGCO Corp. v. Anglin, 216 F.3d 589, 
593-94 (7th Cir. 2000) ("[S]uch agreements must not be so broadly construed as to encompass 
claims that were not intended to be arbitrated under the original contract."); Kalmar Indus. USA 
LLC v. lnt'l Bhd. of Teamsters Local838, 452 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1162-63 (D. Kan. 2006). 
Other courts apply the preference once an agreement to arbitrate has been found. See Janiga v. 
Questar Capital Corp. 615 F.3d 735, 740 (7th Cir. 2010) ("Any 'preference' for arbitration is 
reserved for the interpretation of the scope of a valid arbitration clause ... . ");see also Bd. of 
Trs. of Delray Beach Police & Firefighters Ret. Sys. v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 622 F.3d 
1335,1342 (11thCir. 2010). 
Other courts have applied the preference for arbitration throughout, including to de-
termine if there was an agreement to arbitrate. See Howard Elec. & Mech. Co. v. Frank Briscoe 
Co., 754 F.2d 847, 850 (9th Cir. 1985) (applying preference to the question of "whether an arbi-
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must be "rigorously enforce[d],"247 and "any doubts concerning the 
scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, 
whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract lan-
guage itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbi-
trability."248 This strong policy favoring arbitration will make it diffi-
cult for any defense to succeed. 
In addition, defenses are divided into two types: those that chal-
lenge the arbitration provision and those that challenge or would in-
validate the entire contract. Defenses challenging only the arbitration 
provision may be disputed in court, but defenses that would invali-
date the entire contract are decided by the arbitrator, whose liveli-
hood depends on the use of arbitration.249 You can guess how that is 
likely to turn out. The arbitrator's decision as to whether the defense 
applies is subject to the same high standard required to overturn any 
arbitral award-namely, manifest disregard of the law. 250 
While most potential claims will likely fall to these general barri-
ers, specific claims, such as those for fraud or unconscionability, will 
face additional challenges. 
1. Fraud 
Fraud can be a contract defense, but there is nothing inherently 
fraudulent about an arbitration provision, especially if shareholders 
tration agreement exists and should be enforced," although the question in that case was wheth-
er a clause was a condition precedent to arbitration); see also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler 
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985) (stating that the parties' intentions should be 
"generously construed as to issues of arbitrability," but focusing on the scope of the arbitration 
agreement, not its existence); Blue Cross Blue Shield of Ala. v. Rigas, 923 So. 2d 1077, 1083-84 
(Ala. 2005) (construing the parties' intentions '"generously'" in favor of arbitration). 
The most sensible approach is to apply the preference only after the court finds an 
agreement to arbitrate because "arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required 
to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit." United Steelworkers 
of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960). "[T]he basic objective in 
this area is not to resolve disputes in the quickest manner possible, no matter what the parties' 
wishes, bur to ensure that commercial arbitration agreements, like other contracts, 'are enforced 
according to their terms,' and according to the intentions of the parties." First Options of Chi., 
Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 947 (1995) (citations omitted). 
247. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 625-26 (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 
213, 221 (1985)). 
248. Moses, 460 U.S. at 24-25. 
249. See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445-46 (2006). 
250. See 9 USC. §§ 10, 11 (2006); see also Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattei, Inc., 552 
u.s. 576, 584-86 (2008). 
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approve of it. The federal securities laws require corporations to in-
clude the charter and bylaws in every major filing with the SEC, 
which, for reporting companies, would provide constructive notice of 
the provision to shareholders several times a year. 251 
2. Overwhelming bargaining power and unconscionability 
If the company's directors unilaterally include an arbitration by-
law provision, shareholder plaintiffs may argue that the directors 
have exercised undue influence or overwhelming bargaining pow-
er.252 Because few stockholders have the power to influence the af-
fairs of the corporation, the purchase of stock is an adhesion contract 
with negligible control over corporate affairs. 
However, where a deep and liquid market exists, the arbitration 
provision will be reflected in the share price.253 Any bargaining pow-
er the directors might exercise over the shareholders is paid for by a 
reduction (or increase) in the share price.254 The market's ability to 
push back against any harmful action refutes the claim that the di-
rectors have overwhelming power over shareholders. As long as an 
investor has thousands of other stocks competing for her invest-
ment, the directors can claim no market power over the investor. 
Even assuming the corporation had superior bargaining power, 
"[s]uperior bargaining power alone without the element of unrea-
sonableness does not permit a finding of unconscionability or un-
fairness."255 Delaware courts find "unconscionability or unfairness" 
only where "no man in his senses and not under delusion would 
[agree to it] on the one hand, and as no honest or fair man would ac-
cept [the agreement], on the other."256 
251. See SEC Regulation 5-K, Item 601, table (requiring the charter and bylaws to be in-
cluded as exhibits to forms S-1, S-4, S-11, F-1, F-4, 10, 8-K, 10-D, 10-Q, and 10-K). 
252. The courts refer to both "overweening bargaining power" and "overwhelming bar-
gaining power," which I treat as synonymous. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, 
490 U.S. 477, 483-84 (1989) (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 627). 
253. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246 (1988). 
254. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 594 (1991) (holding that a fo-
rum selection clause in a cruise ticket was reflected in the price of the ticket). 
255. Tulowitzki v. Atl. Richfield Co., 396 A.2d 956, 960 (Del. 1978). 
256. Td. (quoting Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 450 (D.C. Cir. 
1965) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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Arbitrating shareholder disputes benefits shareholders by reduc-
ing the incentives for strike suits, which provide no benefit, and by 
bringing quicker enforcement in meritorious suits. The plaintiffs' bar 
dislikes arbitration for the same reason it should be valued by share-
holders-it gives quick, predictable results. 257 Because of arbitra-
tion's benefits, it is unlikely that a court will find an arbitration pro-
vision unconscionable. 
3. Enforcement violates public policy 
Under Delaware common law, "contracts that offend public poli-
cy or harm the public are deemed void."258 Any public policy argu-
ment against arbitration will certainly fail given the strong federal 
policy favoring arbitration.259 
Plaintiffs might point to two public policies that an arbitration 
provision would offend. First, the federal and state securities laws 
demonstrate a strong public policy favoring shareholder protection. 
This argument will fail because the Supreme Court has already up-
held arbitration agreements against the shareholder protection poli-
cies of the Securities Act of 1933260 and the Exchange Act.261 
Second, plaintiffs might argue that arbitration provisions violate 
a public policy favoring class action litigation for small, similar 
claims. Whatever remains of this policy has been significantly nar-
rowed by the Supreme Court's ruling in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concep-
cion, which upheld arbitration of identical claims of $30.22 brought 
by thousands of litigants.262 
257. See Lewis, supra note 134, at 202-03 (discussing attempts by plaintiffs to increase un-
predictability); Mirvis, supra note 134, at 18; see also Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 
U.S. 265, 280 (1995) ("The advantages of arbitration are many: it is usually cheaper and faster 
than litigation; it can have simpler procedural and evidentiary rules; it normally minimizes hos-
tility and is less disruptive of ongoing and future business dealings among the parties; it is often 
more flexible in regard to scheduling of times and places of hearings and discovery devices.") 
(quoting H.R. REP. No. 97-542, at l3 (1982)). 
258. Lincoln Nat'! Life Ins. Co. v. Joseph Schlanger 2006 Ins. Trust, 28 A. 3d 436, 441 (Del. 
2011) (emphasis omitted). 
259. "[Q]uestions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal 
policy favoring arbitration." Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 
24 (1983) (quoted in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 
(1989)). 
260. Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 478-79. 
261. Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220,238 (1987). 
262. 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744-45, 1753 (2011). 
114 
65 The End of Shareholder Litigation? 
4. Retroactive application 
A bylaw or charter provision probably cannot require arbitration 
of disputes regarding acts that occurred before the provision was ap-
proved. 
In Galaviz v. Berg, the District Court for the Northern District of 
California rejected retroactive application of a forum selection clause 
included in a corporation's bylaws.263 Shareholders derivatively sued 
the directors of Oracle, a Delaware corporation, for defrauding the 
federal government.264 Eight years after the fraud began, but before 
the actions were filed, Oracle's board adopted a bylaw provision that 
named the Delaware Court of Chancery as the exclusive forum for 
any derivative action.265 
The court rejected the retroactive application of the bylaw be-
cause "the venue provision was unilaterally adopted by the directors 
who [were] defendants in this action, after the majority of the pur-
ported wrongdoing [was] alleged to have occurred, and without the 
consent of existing shareholders who acquired their shares when no 
such bylaw was in effect."266 
The same result would likely be reached under Delaware law. 
The Galaviz court did not perform a choice of law analysis, never dis-
cussed the internal affairs doctrine, and never said which state's law 
applied,267 but in Salaman v. National Media Corp., a Delaware court 
held that a bylaw amendment could not modify a director indemnity 
provision after the director had already been sued.268 A company 
probably could not enforce an arbitration provision that tried to ret-
roactively apply to prior bad acts. 
263. 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
264. I d. at 1171 ~72. 
265. Id.; see also In re Revlon, Inc. S'holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 959~61 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
266. Galaviz, 763 F. Supp. 2d at 1174. 
267. !d. at 1174 ("Oracle has not pointed to any commercial contract case upholding a 
venue provision that was inserted by a purported unilateral amendment to existing contract 
terms."). 
268. Salaman v. Nat'! Media Corp., No. 92C-01-161, 1992 WL 808095, at *6 (Del. Super. 
Ct. Oct. 8, 1992). 
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5. Vested rights 
Shareholders who purchase their shares after the arbitration pro-
vision is adopted will have a difficult time arguing that they should 
not be bound by it. But shareholders that purchase before the arbitra-
tion provision is adopted may argue they have a vested interest in 
the continued availability of the courts. 
This argument will fail because shareholders have no vested 
rights to any bylaw provision if the directors are authorized to uni-
laterally amend them. 269 
6. Detrimental reliance 
Shareholders that purchase before the adoption of an arbitration 
provision may argue that they detrimentally relied on the availability 
of the courts when purchasing the stock. Detrimental reliance is an 
element of a claim for equitable estoppel, which arises when "a par-
ty, by his conduct or words, intentionally or unintentionally leads 
another, in reliance on such words or conduct, to change his position 
to his detriment."270 This reliance must be reasonable, and Delaware 
has held that if a corporation allows unilateral bylaw amendments by 
the board, a party cannot reasonably rely on the bylaws remaining 
constant. 271 
7. Duty of good faith and fair dealing and fiduciary duties 
If the arbitration provision is adopted unilaterally by the board or 
by a ma!ority of shareholders over the objections of minority share-
holders, 72 plaintiffs may argue that the amendment violates the du-
269. Kidsco Inc. v. Dinsmore, 674 A.2d 483, 492 (Del. Ch. 1995) (" [T]he only vested right 
left is that specified in 8 Del. C. § 394, which prohibits a statutory charter amendment from tak-
ing away or impairing any remedy against any corporation or its officers for any liability which 
shall have been previously incurred." (alterations omitted) (emphasis omitted) (citations omit-
ted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
270. See Hartman v. Buckson, 467 A.2d 694,697 (Del. Ch. 1983). 
271. Kidsco, 674 A.2d at 493 n.7 ("TLC By-law Section 7.8 undercuts SoftKey's contention 
that its rights vested because it detrimentally 'relied' on the then-existing by-law. Clearly any 
such reliance by SoftKey was not justifiable, since SoftKey was on notice that the by-law was 
subject to amendment by the TLC board."). 
272. Majority shareholders sometimes owe a fiduciary duty to minority shareholders. See 
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ty of good faith and fair dealing. Every party to a contract has a duty 
of good faith and fair dealing, which includes how a party exercises 
its power to amend the terms.273 
In evaluating bylaws, Delaware largely defers to the board's 
judgment.274 Delaware courts presume bylaws are valid and reject 
them only if they are "clearl~ adopted for an inequitable purpose and 
have an inequitable effect."2 5 
It is unlikely that a court would find an arbitration bylaw 
amendment to have an inequitable purpose or effect. As discussed 
above, arbitration agreements are just a specialized type of forum se-
lection clause, 276 and the Delaware Chancery Court has suggested 
that corporations can include forum selection clauses in their gov-
ernance documents. 277 So a court applying Delaware law would like-
ly reject this defense. 
This defense is also preempted by the FAA because it "rel[ies] 
on the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate" as the basis for find-
ing the provision unenforceable. 278 Phrased another way, every by-
law or charter provision changes some aspect of the corporation. If 
the only reason that this change is objectionable is because it re-
quires arbitration, then the defense cannot apply. 
8. Gravely difficult and inconvenient forum 
Arbitration clauses are a "specialized kind of forum-selection 
clause."279 Forum selection clauses are unenforceable if the forum is 
Kahn v. Lynch Commc'ns Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1115 (Del. I 994). This duty is never greater 
than the duty owed by directors, and I find that the directors' duty is not breached, so I do not 
analyze the duty of majority shareholders separately. 
273. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 205 cmt. e (1981); see also AT&T Mobility 
LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744 (2011) (upholding an arbitration agreement in a con-
tract that "authorized AT&T to make unilateral amendments, which it did to the arbitration 
provision on several occasions"). 
274. Hollinger lnr'l, Inc. v. Black, 844 A.2d 1022, 1080 (Del. Ch. 2004); see also Badie v. 
Bank of Am., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273, 284 (Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (stating that it would violate the 
duty of good faith and fair dealing to insert an arbitration agreement into a contract, even where 
the contract granted power to modifY or amend the contract unilaterally). 
275. Hollinger, 844 A.2d at 1080. 
276. See supra note 161. 
277. In re Revlon, Inc. S'holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960-61 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
278. AT&T, 131 S. Ct. at 1747 (2011) (quoting Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 493 n.9 
(1987)). 
279. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, 490 U.S. 477,482-83 (1989) (quoting 
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"so gravely difficult and inconvenient that [a plaintiff] will for all 
practical purposes be deprived of his day in court."280 Arbitration in 
Delaware or New York is unlikely to be considered gravely difficult 
or inconvenient. The difficulty of getting to these corporate hubs is 
likely overwhelmed by the "strong presumption in favor of enforce-
ment [of forum selection clauses] . . . reinforced b~ the emphatic 
federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute resolution."2 1 
V. CONCLUSION 
The inefficiencies of shareholder litigation impose tremendous 
costs on shareholders. Arbitration can reduce the costs of strike suits 
and can more rapidly resolve meritorious suits. By allowing corpora-
tions the freedom to innovate, we would leverage the full creativity 
of the shareholders and boards to balance enforcement. 
This can be accomplished through an amendment to either the 
charter or bylaws, which will likely be considered a contract that 
binds shareholders. Courts applying the Federal Arbitration Act will 
likely enforce the provision, and it is unlikely that any defense will 
apply. The only obstacle is the SEC's position that arbitration vio-
lates the Exchange Act. The SEC must bring its statutory interpreta-
tion in line with current Supreme Court precedent to allow compa-
nies the full benefits of customized enforcement. 
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974)); see also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Sol-
er Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985). 
280. MIS Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. I, 18 (1972). 
281. Mitsubishi, 4 73 U.S. at 631. 
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